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PRIVATE IMMIGRATION SCREENING IN 
THE WORKPLACE 
Stephen Lee* 
For over twenty years, our immigration laws have required employers to 
screen their workforces for “unauthorized” immigrants. But rather than punish 
employers for failing to carry out these duties, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) has worked with employers to identify unauthorized workers for 
removal—even where it is abundantly clear that employers are reporting the very 
workers they unlawfully hired in the first place, and are doing so to retaliate 
against workers who assert labor and employment rights. How can a law that 
was designed to punish employers be used to reward them? This Article attempts 
to explain this counterintuitive result. Although the DHS-employer relationship 
appears to be contentious and antagonistic, that relationship can often be highly 
collaborative and mutually beneficial, where the DHS overlooks employer 
indiscretions in exchange for help identifying potentially removable immigrants. 
In this way, employers resemble other immigration screeners, like airport 
inspectors and state and local law enforcement officers, who assist the DHS by 
winnowing down to a manageable size the pool of potentially removable 
immigrants. This Article therefore argues that employers should be regulated as 
screeners where employers should be punished for using their screening 
authority beyond the scope of its intended use, which often means employers 
using reporting and the threat of reporting to avoid liability for labor and 
employment violations. Thus, while our immigration laws contemplate punishing 
employers at the front end for who they hire, this Article argues our laws should 
also punish employers at the back end for who they report. As one set of 
* Law Fellow, Stanford Law School. For comments and conversations about this 
Article, I am grateful to Michelle W. Anderson, Linda Bosniak, Peter Brownell, Kitty 
Calavita, Eunice Cho, Brooke Coleman, Richard Craswell, Tino Cuéllar, John Greenman, 
Clare Huntington, Elizabeth Joh, Herma Hill Kay, Kathleen Kim, Stephen Legomsky, Hillel 
Levin, Gerald López, Jeanne Merino, Huyen Pham, Andrea Roth, Nirej Sekhon, David 
Sklansky, Jayashri Srikantiah, Naomi Tsu, and Rose Cuison Villazor. I owe an 
immeasurable debt to Hiroshi Motomura and Norman Spaulding for their help and support 
throughout this project. For commenting on early versions of this Article, I thank Jennifer 
Chacón, Denise Gilman, Cristina Rodríguez, Michael Wishnie, and the other participants in 
the works-in-progress sessions at the 2008 Immigration Law Teachers Conference and the 
2008 Joint Conference for Asian Pacific American Law Faculty and Western Law Teachers 
of Color. Finally, I should note that this Article benefited greatly from the hard work of the 
Stanford Law Review editors, and from first-rate research support provided by the reference 
librarians at Stanford’s Robert Crown Law Library. All errors are my own. 
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remedies, this Article proposes subjecting employers to possible audits if they 
report workers to the DHS, and applying the exclusionary rule against complicit 
immigration officials. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The latest figures place the unauthorized immigrant population at about 12 
million.1 Meanwhile, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)2 boasts 
that it removed over 275,000 noncitizens in 2007.3 How does the DHS decide 
which of our nation’s 12 million unauthorized immigrants will be removed and 
which will remain? How do unauthorized immigrants enter the removal 
pipeline? Who actually makes these immigration decisions? While scholars 
have offered rich and textured analyses of the ever-expanding grounds for 
removing immigrants, surprisingly little attention has been paid to immigration 
screeners—the persons and institutions that assist the DHS in identifying 
candidates for removal. This Article focuses on one undertheorized site of 
1. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 1, available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf. 
2. Prior to 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was the agency that 
carried out sanctions and workplace enforcement, and so my use of “INS” refers to that era 
of immigration enforcement. In 2003, the functions of the INS were transferred to the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
3. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL 
REPORT: PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY, at iv (2007), 
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/ice07ar_final.pdf. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) is housed within the DHS. 
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immigration screening and one particularly problematic set of immigration 
screeners: the workplace and our nation’s employers.4 
For over twenty years, our immigration policy has effectively conditioned 
access to work on proof of citizenship or lawful status. Passed in 1986, the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) prohibits our nation’s employers 
from hiring anyone other than citizens or those otherwise “authorized” to work. 
It effectuates this mandate by requiring employers to screen their workforces 
and “verify” the immigration status of their workers.5 Thus, along with port-of-
entry inspectors, international carriers, asylum officers, and an increasing 
number of state and local law enforcement officers, employers assist the DHS 
in a screening capacity by identifying those immigrants who, in their judgment, 
ought to be reported to DHS officials for removal. Screeners in effect winnow 
down the universe of potentially unauthorized immigrants to a manageable 
size. 
For immigration purposes, our nation’s employers remain a significant and 
significantly misunderstood group of immigration decision makers. The sheer 
number of employers makes them significant. The number of public 
immigration officials within the DHS—the public agency charged with the duty 
of making immigration-screening decisions—is approximately 31,500.6 But 
4. Employers have not, however, been undercriticized. Indeed, the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, has generated an 
impressive body of work addressing the different ways in which the statute has proven to be 
ineffective. See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the 
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955; Martha F. Davis, 
Lucas Guttentag & Allan H. Wernick, Report of the Committee on Immigration and 
Nationality Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York: An Analysis of 
Discrimination Resulting from Employer Sanctions and a Call for Repeal, 26 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 711 (1989); Cecelia Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343 (1994); Jeffrey Manns, Private 
Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 
887; Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor 
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345 (2001); Huyen Pham, 
The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777 (2008); Maurice A. Roberts 
& Stephen Yale-Loehr, Employers as Junior Immigration Inspectors: The Impact of the 
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 21 INT’L LAW. 1013 (1987); Juliet Stumpf & 
Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration Law: One Step Forward, 
Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2002); Michael J. Wishnie, 
Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 193. 
5. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359. 
6. ICE and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) are the 
divisions within the DHS responsible for handling the majority of immigration-related 
decisions. According to the DHS, in 2007 ICE employed more than 16,500 people and 
USCIS employed more than 15,000 people. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
USCIS ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/USCIS_annual_report_part1.pdf; U.S. 
IMMIGRATIONS & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 3, at 1. The total number of public 
officials is at most 31,500 because USCIS employs both “federal and contract employees,” 
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because our immigration laws require all employers to verify the immigration 
status of their employees, even focusing on just a handful of the industries that 
have traditionally relied on immigrant labor reveals a startling reality: within 
the construction and manufacturing/production industries, for example, no 
fewer than 1.1 million employers—private entities—must screen their 
employees to ascertain and verify immigration status.7 This means that an at-
best-loosely-organized group of private screeners is effectively deciding which 
immigrants in the workplace can stay and which should be reported for 
removal. 
Despite the reach of their influence over immigration matters in the 
workplace, employers have nonetheless remained significantly misunderstood 
as decision makers. Employers are not uncommonly seen as the targets of 
regulation, where the primary regulatory challenge involves properly 
calibrating the level of enforcement against employers to deter them from 
hiring unauthorized immigrants.8 This is not entirely surprising given IRCA’s 
logic. Like other third-party liability schemes, it seeks to disrupt what can often 
be a collusive relationship. Many employers seek out low-wage unskilled labor, 
and many unauthorized immigrants in turn seek out work opportunities to 
support themselves and their families. But while it is true that IRCA formally 
prohibits employers from hiring unauthorized immigrants under threat of civil 
and criminal sanction, it has been so infrequently enforced that employers can 
escape detection in all but the most egregious circumstances.9 As a result, the 
employer-worker relationship, while collusive, has become asymmetrical: 
unencumbered by the fear of being punished, employers can threaten to report 
workers for removal, whereas workers do not possess any similar ability to 
blow the whistle on employers. Therefore, in many instances, employers and 
demonstrating the extent to which public entities have come to rely on private actors. U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra, at 3. 
7. According to a recent report, in 2004 the six most immigrant-dependent industries, 
in decreasing order of dependence, were: (1) farming, fishing, and forestry; (2) construction; 
(3) building and grounds maintenance; (4) production (manufacturing); (5) food preparation 
and serving; and (6) transportation. See RANDY CAPPS, KARINA FORTUNY & MICHAEL FIX, 
TRENDS IN THE LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT LABOR FORCE, 2000-2005, at 7 tbl.4 (2007), 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411426_Low-Wage_Immigrant_ 
Labor.pdf. According to the U.S. Census, in 2004 there were 760,400 and 339,100 
“Construction” and “Manufacturing” establishments, respectively, which comes to just under 
1.1 million total establishments. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2008 STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT, TABLE 736: ESTABLISHMENTS, EMPLOYEES, AND PAYROLL BY EMPLOYMENT-SIZE 
CLASS AND INDUSTRY: 2000 TO 2004 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/ 
statab/2008/tables/08s0736.pdf. 
8. See, e.g., Manns, supra note 4, at 931 (“The fundamental problem is that both 
employers of low-wage workers and undocumented aliens share a strong economic interest 
in engaging in formal compliance yet substantive subversion of the verification process.”); 
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1735-36 (2006). 
9. See infra Part II.A. 
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employers alone decide which unauthorized immigrants in the workplace can 
remain, and which will be reported for removal. 
What has been the result? The immediate harms have been harsh and 
increasingly apparent. Within industries traditionally dependent on immigrant 
labor, employers recruit and hire unauthorized workers, and use their de facto 
immunity from sanctions to negotiate low wages, disregard workplace 
protections, and otherwise suppress worker dissent. Moreover, with increasing 
frequency, employers seem to be contacting the DHS to request that it inspect 
their own workplaces and detain and remove the same unauthorized workers 
they recruited and hired in the first place. And while some may reach out to the 
DHS as an attempt to carry out their screening duties in good faith, the growing 
anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that many employers report workers 
in retaliation for unauthorized immigrants’ attempting to assert their labor and 
employment rights. Employers, therefore, possess a great deal of discretion 
over whom they hire and whom they report, and in both instances it appears 
they exercise that discretion in a manner that elevates their interest in 
maximizing profit over the interests of advancing the goals of our nation’s 
immigration and labor and employment laws. As Michael Wishnie explains, 
IRCA’s perversity stems from “a law-breaking employer [who] may invoke the 
formidable powers of the government’s law enforcement apparatus to terrorize 
its workers and suppress worker dissent under threat of deportation.”10 
Though we know what employers are supposed to do (verify the 
immigration status of their workers), and what they are instead more likely to 
do (hire unauthorized workers and threaten removal to gain a bargaining 
advantage), we know little about why the DHS continues to rely on employer 
“tips” and “leads,” and we know even less about what the long-term effects will 
be on immigration. Finding a solution to the problem of exploitation requires, 
therefore, answering a whole series of questions that move us beyond a one-
dimensional understanding of employers as regulatory targets engaging in 
lawless behavior. 
Answering those questions requires us to first take account of the way 
IRCA has actually been implemented. I employ the following diagram for 
expositional help. 
 
10. Wishnie, supra note 4, at 216. 
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Figure 1. Comparing IRCA’s Design and its Implementation 
 
IRCA’s Design               IRCA’s Implementation 
 
Regulator(s) INS            INS/DHS             Employers 
 
 
  
 
 
Regulatory Target(s)              Employers             Unauthorized         Unauthorized 
                                                                  Immigrants            Immigrants 
 
Taking seriously this “regulatory retriangulation,”11 I provide in this 
Article a descriptive account of how employers have become not just agents of 
exploitation, but also agents of the State. I want to suggest that our nation’s 
employers are best understood as private immigration screeners12 who identify 
potentially unauthorized immigrants within their workforces for removal. Just 
as port-of-entry inspectors screen for ineligible entrants, and state and local law 
enforcement officers screen investigatory targets for removable noncitizens, 
our nation’s employers screen their workforces for immigrants that lack 
authorization and are otherwise removable. Therefore, the DHS persists in 
working with (rather than completely against) employers because they provide 
a variety of screening services. Some of those services attach through the 
compulsion or encouragement of law, like examining documents and 
consulting databases to verify immigration status.13 Other services, like 
11. While others have made passing note of this dynamic, I seek to fully elaborate the 
role transition undertaken by employers. See Nessel, supra note 4, at 360 (noting that while 
“IRCA was intended to punish employers” many INS initiatives have targeted only 
workers). 
12. Huyen Pham has made an important first contribution by analyzing the costs and 
benefits of what she describes as the private enforcement of immigration laws. See Pham, 
supra note 4, at 783. But Pham expressly leaves open some of the theoretical questions this 
Article endeavors to answer:  
This Article focuses on the efficacy of the shifting, but the phenomenon of private 
enforcement also raises similar legal and political questions: are governments also shifting 
political accountability for immigration law enforcement? If a private party violates civil 
rights laws, who should be held responsible for damages—the private party, the government 
requiring the private enforcement, both or none? Finally, should private parties be 
compensated in some way for their new enforcement responsibilities? 
Id. at 783-84. 
13. See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the 
Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1098-99 (2008); see also Press Release, 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Highlights Best Practices for Maintaining Legal Workforces 
(July 26, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0966.shtm 
(explaining that DHS policy encourages employers to join the “Basic Pilot Employment 
Verification” program, which provides employers access to an internet-based federal 
database to help determine the work eligibility of their employees). 
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reporting the presence of unauthorized immigrants to the DHS14 and 
coordinating workplace inspections and raids,15 have emerged out of an 
evolved regulatory practice and culture of collaboration. But in any event, all 
these services permit employers to shape the conditions under which 
unauthorized immigrants remain in the United States and define the conditions 
triggering DHS detention and removal. 
Having painted a descriptive reality where the DHS and our nation’s 
employers collaboratively screen for unauthorized immigrants, I then turn to 
the normative implications that arise from such an arrangement. In particular, I 
focus on the consequences of this collaboration and argue that this informal 
regulatory partnership has exacted both legal and democratic costs. The legal 
costs are straightforward and concrete. Permitting employers to report—and 
use the threat of reporting against—workers effectively prevents workers from 
asserting labor and employment rights they would otherwise be entitled to 
assert. Such a practice also incurs democratic costs, which are no less troubling. 
Employer screening that proceeds on a self-serving basis incentivizes 
immigrant workers to embrace docility and avoid activity that draws attention, 
such as participating in a union drive or pressing claims for overtime pay. But 
the workplace remains one of the few social institutions where immigrant 
adults can encounter and develop meaningful relationships with nonfamily 
citizens, becoming in the process more integrated into their surrounding 
communities and larger society. Employer screening has therefore diminished 
the capacity of the workplace to provide more than just an opportunity to earn a 
paycheck. It injects the threat of removal as one more set of costs workers must 
bear in attempting to foster a sense of community and solidarity and 
investment. 
Part of my ambition is to unsettle our notions surrounding the type of 
behavior we ought to reward when screening for unauthorized immigrants. 
Some have argued that unauthorized immigrants, who work hard and endure 
great difficulties, should, after a number of years, be permitted to regularize 
their status. This type of immigration policy rewards those who avoid attracting 
attention to themselves, and indeed, some have rationalized the removal of 
criminal noncitizens—who, at least in principle, have attracted substantial 
attention to themselves by virtue of their convictions—on precisely this 
ground.16 The case of employer screening, however, suggests that rewarding 
this type of behavior in the workplace can have perverse consequences. 
Because employers are often regulated by workers who either report workplace 
violations to enforcement agencies, like the Department of Labor, or bring 
enforcement actions themselves, a screening system that rewards immigrant 
14. See Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: The Border Crossed Us: Current Issues in 
Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 389, 389 (2004).  
15. See Aldana, supra note 13, at 1100. 
16. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007).  
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workers who (quite reasonably) lay low to avoid removal, only encourages 
labor and employment violations and fosters a culture of lawlessness. This 
raises the troubling specter that employers will use unauthorized immigrants to 
diminish workplace protections for all workers, and that unauthorized 
immigrants will be discouraged from developing bonds with citizens within the 
workplace, one of the few social institutions that facilitates the integration of 
adult immigrants. 
The balance of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains and 
develops the idea of employers as immigration screeners. After briefly 
summarizing IRCA’s ambition of transforming employers into immigration 
screeners by regulating whom employers hired, this Part then marries this 
narrative to the prevailing scholarship surrounding immigration screening. The 
Part concludes by turning away from IRCA’s design and toward an exploration 
of how it has actually been implemented. Here, I trace out the consequences of 
the DHS’s virtual nonregulation of employer hiring decisions. I explain how 
this regulatory strategy has impoverished the workplace, both because it 
effectively suppresses the assertion of legal rights for labor and employment 
violations, and because it diminishes the democracy-enhancing potential of the 
workplace and obstructs the integration of immigrants into their surrounding 
communities. 
Part II delves into the origins of the DHS’s contemporary practice of 
nonenforcement. By disentangling the web of enforcement realities, rationales, 
and collaborations running throughout the workplace, I hope to explain why 
and how a law that was designed to punish employers has been implemented in 
a way that rewards them. Part III advances my prescriptive claims. Having 
zeroed in on the legal and democratic harms flowing from the workplace, this 
Part argues in favor of developing immigration policies that broaden their 
regulatory focus. Rather than focusing only on whom employers hire, I argue in 
favor of broadening our regulatory focus to account for whom employers report 
to the DHS for removal. Doing so will keep employers and complicit low-level 
DHS officials more accountable and will send the proper signals: namely that 
employers ought not use immigration laws to serve their own goals to the 
detriment of labor and employment protections and the workplace’s potential to 
strengthen our democracy. I explore audits and the exclusionary rule as 
concrete examples of this shift towards greater accountability. I then conclude.  
I. EMPLOYERS AS IMMIGRATION SCREENERS 
A. IRCA: Screening Out “Unauthorized” Workers 
Laws requiring employers to screen their workforces for unauthorized 
immigrants have appeared at the federal, state, and local levels in some form 
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for more than thirty years.17 Though these laws differ in minor respects, they 
all operate in roughly the same manner: by prohibiting employers from hiring 
unauthorized immigrants, and by imposing verification duties on employers, 
where they must examine certain documents and determine whether their 
employees are authorized to work in the United States. 
In 1971, California passed the nation’s first employer sanctions law.18 
Under the threat of criminal penalties, California forbade employers from 
“knowingly” employing a noncitizen who was not entitled to lawful residence 
in the United States if such employment had “an adverse effect” on U.S. 
citizens and other lawful workers.19 Employers were also subject to civil 
actions. Such proceedings could be initiated by anyone.20 Before then, 
employers in California were free to hire unauthorized workers, and they did so 
openly and unapologetically.21 
California’s employer sanction laws eventually made their way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1975, when several lawful migrant farmworkers sought to 
enjoin employers from hiring unauthorized workers. The lower courts had 
uniformly concluded that California’s employer sanctions regime 
unconstitutionally encroached upon Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate 
17. Scholars have made only passing reference to the idea that employers make 
immigration-related screening decisions regarding their workforce. See David A. Martin, 
Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 546 
(2007) (characterizing IRCA and its verification requirements as requiring employers to 
engage in “immigration screening”); Stumpf & Friedman, supra note 4, at 137 (noting that 
IRCA “effectively makes employers parties to enforcement of the immigration laws 
affecting the labor market. Employers themselves become the primary method of screening 
the labor pool for employees that the State has not authorized to work” (citation omitted)); 
Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance 15 (Harvard Law 
Sch., Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-12, 2008) (noting that employer sanctions 
statutes encourage employers to screen aliens for work permits and penalize employers when 
they fail to perform this function). 
18. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (1983) (repealed 1988). Eleven other states and one 
city followed suit, including Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Vermont, Virginia, and Las Vegas. See KITTY 
CALAVITA, CALIFORNIA’S “EMPLOYER SANCTIONS”: THE CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING LAW 4 
n.3 (1982). I focus on California because the decisional law addressing this particular pre-
IRCA employer sanction law is well developed, and thus provides a useful window into the 
motivations, concerns, and anxieties of that period. 
19. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a)-(b) (1983) (repealed 1988).  
20. Id. § 2805(c).  
21. In the months leading up to section 2805’s passage, the California Courts of 
Appeal rendered several decisions denying relief to citizen and otherwise lawful migrant 
farmworkers. Though courts consistently ruled against plaintiffs on the theory that regulating 
immigrants was a responsibility best left to the federal government, they often expressed 
dismay over what they understood to be a gaping hole in our nation’s immigration laws. See, 
e.g., Larez v. Oberti, 100 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Ct. App. 1972); Cobos v. Mello-Dy Ranch, 98 Cal. 
Rptr. 131 (Ct. App. 1971). Although the decision in Larez was rendered after section 2805 
was passed, the challenged activities occurred before its passage. See Larez, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 
63 & n.5. 
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immigration.22 The Supreme Court reversed in De Canas v. Bica, holding 
California’s law to be valid and concluding that Congress had not intended for 
the “complete ouster of state power” in this area of regulation.23 From a 
constitutional standpoint, De Canas is typically cited for the proposition that 
state and local—and not just federal—authorities possess the authority to 
regulate unauthorized immigrants. But its broader juridical implications 
reaffirm the principle that within our nation’s immigration regime, public 
entities may continue to structure private relationships to achieve immigration 
ends.24 
In 1986, Congress passed IRCA, which created for the first time a federal 
employer sanctions scheme.25 IRCA prohibited employers from “knowingly” 
hiring immigrants who were not authorized to work. Importantly, it imposed 
screening responsibilities on employers, requiring them to verify the 
immigration status of their workers and to keep records on whom they hired. 
Anyone who secures a job in the United States must fill out the by-now-
familiar I-9 form. This form verifies that the employee is authorized to work in 
the United States, must be completed within three days of hire, and must be 
supported by documentation establishing the worker’s identity.26 Under IRCA, 
employers face civil and criminal fines for failing to carry out these screening 
duties. 
Congress transferred screening authority to employers because 
employment opportunities were understood to be “job magnets” drawing in a 
22. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353-54 (1976). 
23. Id. at 357. Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that although 
the immigration power was federal in nature, states retained some authority to pass at least 
some measures affecting immigrants. California’s decision to regulate immigrants, the Court 
explained, did not automatically become a “constitutionally proscribed regulation of 
immigration” at least where such regulation had “some purely speculative and indirect 
impact on immigration.” Id. at 355. Thus, it was perfectly fine that California prohibited the 
hiring of noncitizens who “have no federal right to employment within the country” in order 
to “strengthen its economy.” Id. 
24. The last time state and local governments engaged in a coordinated campaign to 
structure private relationships for immigration purposes was during the early part of the 
twentieth century when several western states passed “alien land laws” prohibiting “aliens 
ineligible to citizenship” from obtaining any interest in land ownership. See Oyama v. 
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934); Cockrill v. 
California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O’Brien, 263 
U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 
197 (1923). 
25. IRCA also expressly overruled employer sanctions laws passed by state and local 
entities, including California’s. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (“The provisions of 
[IRCA] preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than 
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for 
employment, unauthorized aliens.”). For excellent summaries of the tumultuous events 
leading up to the passage of IRCA and the difficulties of placating the diverse set of 
competing interests, see ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY 
IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 354-75 (2006) and Wishnie, supra note 4. 
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(C)(i)-(ii) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)-(b) (2009). 
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constant stream of unauthorized migration. Thus, targeting employers was 
central to Congress’s strategy for regulating unauthorized immigration.27 
Employer sanctions prohibit immigrants from working without authorization 
and prohibit employers from hiring workers without first verifying the 
proffered documentation. Conditioning U.S. jobs on proof of authorization, so 
the logic went, would deter immigrants from coming to the United States for 
work reasons, encourage those that were here without meaningful job 
opportunities to return home, and over the long term reduce the rate of 
unauthorized migration. IRCA therefore created a segmented but seamless 
chain of liability. As the Supreme Court has noted, Congress created a 
sprawling statute putting both employers and workers on the hook by making it 
“impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United 
States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional 
policies.”28 
B. The Challenges of Immigration Screening 
If employers perform screening duties, where do they fit within the larger 
universe of immigration screeners?  In what ways do their challenges resemble 
those of other screeners, and in what ways do they stand apart?  What kinds of 
behavior does employer screening reward and what does it punish? 
In sizing up employer screening, it is useful to remind ourselves that 
nation’s immigration laws orchestrate what has aptly been characterized as the 
project of “national self-definition.”29 At the highest level of abstraction, 
members select new members, and in the process argue about, negotiate, 
remember, and ultimately decide who “we” are as Americans.30 And while 
many social institutions are swimming in the sort of political and legal 
discourse that invites arguments about “who we are” (schools, marriage, and 
the military come to mind), none quite so literally implicates the “we” question 
as do the laws regulating access to immigration and citizenship. This is why 
screening matters—it operationalizes our abstract ideas about who we are. 
Within legal scholarship, few have addressed the empirical aspects of 
immigration screening. In a series of articles, Janet Gilboy thoughtfully 
addresses the challenges of screening entrants at international airports, perhaps 
the most obvious and familiar example of immigration screening. Primary line 
inspectors in airports must examine a traveler’s documents and determine in a 
short period of time whether the entrant is eligible to enter on the basis of those 
27. See Wishnie, supra note 4, at 195-96. 
28. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002) (emphasis 
added). 
29. Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional 
Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1944 (1996). 
30. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1991).  
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documents.31 If the documents are valid and permit entry, the entrant is 
screened in. But if the entrant arouses suspicion, the inspector directs the 
entrant to secondary inspection where immigration officials can engage in more 
extensive questioning and perhaps search the entrant’s baggage. Thus, for many 
entrants, primary inspectors constitute the main screening hurdle to be cleared 
in gaining entrance into the United States.32 
Primary inspectors have to make very quick screening decisions and 
determine which of the hundreds of entrants they inspect daily are ineligible to 
enter. They look for signs that the entrant is not who she says she is. For 
example, an immigration agent may be more likely to screen in an entrant who 
can produce a letter of employment from a well-known employer than she is an 
entrant who is associated with an obscure one, or who produces no letter at 
all.33 Similarly, an inspector might think nothing of a traveler fumbling the 
names of the relatives she is visiting, unless that traveler is a young woman, 
31. See Janet A. Gilboy, Deciding Who Gets In: Decisionmaking by Immigration 
Inspectors, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 571, 590-91 (1991) [hereinafter Gilboy, Deciding Who 
Gets In]. Under screening procedures, the primary inspector either admits the entrant, or if 
her suspicions are aroused, directs the entrant to secondary inspection, where the secondary 
inspector can make a more thorough and comprehensive inquiry into the entrant’s identity 
and motives. For a more detailed description, see id. at 574-77. Gilboy has written 
extensively about the regulatory challenges that flow from immigration inspection in the 
airport context. See Janet A. Gilboy, Compelled Third-Party Participation in the Regulatory 
Process: Legal Duties, Culture, and Noncompliance, 20 LAW & POL’Y 135 (1998) 
[hereinafter Gilboy, Compelled Third-Party Participation]; Janet A. Gilboy, Implications of 
“Third-Party” Involvement in Enforcement: The INS, Illegal Travelers, and International 
Airlines, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 505 (1997) [hereinafter Gilboy, Implications of “Third-
Party” Involvement]. 
32. To help deter these sorts of unauthorized entries, immigration officials enlist the 
help of airlines, which, much like employers, are required to examine and verify the travel 
documents of their passengers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006). Airline sanction laws bear the 
same structural features of those creating employer sanctions—Congress has imposed a set 
of obligations onto a private entity, which is charged with the duty of carrying out a service 
traditionally carried out by a public entity. Airlines are fined for failing to determine that a 
passenger possessed improper documentation for entry into the United States, and in 
addition, face the responsibility of transporting the undesirable entrant out of the United 
States. See Gilboy, Implications of “Third Party” Involvement, supra note 31, at 509. The 
offending airline also incurs the costs associated with detention and custody, to the extent 
such costs arise. See id. 
33. Gilboy notes that primary immigration inspectors exhibit a tendency to screen in 
entrants when they can furnish an employment letter from “respectable companies.” She 
explains: 
In these cases, there is a tendency for inspectors to rely on the company’s own screening of 
job candidates. This is essential “surrogate screening,” in which an earlier institution’s 
decisionmaking is substituted for a fresh screening. Thus, decisions by other institutions, not 
within the legal system, come to affect legal decisionmaking. 
Gilboy, Deciding Who Gets In, supra note 31, at 592. In the airport screening context, 
primary inspectors are well aware that it is their judgment that makes them valuable, and 
what subjects them to promotion or punishment. They are incentivized to overadmit with 
low-risk cases because “their judgment is likely to be called into question if they refer a 
series of perceived ‘nothing’ cases to secondary inspectors.” Id. at 584. 
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from an Eastern European country with a burgeoning black market for overseas 
“nannies.”34 
Immigration screening also takes place in the interior of the United States. 
For example, some scholars have noted that state and local law enforcement 
officers are increasingly providing screening services as our immigration 
regime fortifies its ties to the criminal justice system.35 As the DHS has shifted 
its removal priorities towards criminal noncitizens, it has increasingly relied on 
the help of state and local law enforcement officers, who can cross-check the 
names of motorists in a computer database to ascertain whether those motorists 
have any continuing immigration violations.36 Other jurisdictions have 
attempted to impose similar screening duties onto landlords and university 
officials.37 
The workplace has long served as a site for screening immigrants, though 
this phenomenon has largely been appreciated within the context of the formal 
immigration system. Every year about 160,000 people immigrate each year 
because an employer has served as a sponsor,38 highlighting the extent to 
which the workplace functions as a place where immigrants are screened into 
the United States and identified as potential citizens on the basis of their skills, 
talents, and efforts as workers. While Congress may be interested in identifying 
immigrants who might contribute to American workplaces and eventually 
become citizens, the costs required to undertake such an endeavor render 
impractical any policy that relies only on Congress, agencies, and other public 
entities. Therefore, Congress devolves some screening authority to employers 
who, in their capacity as current members of the national community, may 
sponsor new members, and in the process bear the costs of growing the polity. 
Employers seeking to sponsor and screen in employees (and not the State) must 
34. See id. at 590-91. In this “nanny” scenario, the inspector would direct the entrant to 
secondary inspection, where the secondary inspector could make a more thorough and 
comprehensive inquiry into the entrant’s identity and motives. For a more detailed 
description of the screening procedures, see id. at 574-77. 
35.  See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 385 (2006); see also Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local 
Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004). 
36. Wishnie, supra note 35, at 1095-96. 
37. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 
2060-65 (2008). 
38. Another approximately 650,000 persons immigrate because a family member has 
sponsored them. See MIGRATION POLICY INST., FACT SHEET NO. 16, ANNUAL IMMIGRATION 
TO THE UNITED STATES: THE REAL NUMBERS 1 (2007), [hereinafter ANNUAL IMMIGRATION 
REPORT], available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS16_USImmigration_ 
051807.pdf. This is unsurprising given that one of the central goals of our immigration laws 
is to unite families. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and 
the Limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 358 (“Immigration laws are not blind to the 
rights and needs of families; indeed, family reunification is a central part of United States 
immigration law.”); see also Hiroshi Motomura, We Asked for Workers, but Families Came: 
Time, Law, and the Family in Immigration and Citizenship, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 103 
(2006). 
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spend time and money to review education credentials, skill sets, and 
references.39 Just as important, employers are better able to evaluate such 
criteria. Microsoft and Oracle can more effectively identify competent high-
skilled workers than can the agency for United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services. From the State’s perspective, transferring screening 
responsibilities to employers provides a cost-effective way to winnow down the 
universe of potential immigrants to a manageable size.  
While immigration admission laws allow employers to screen immigrants 
to identify potential citizens, IRCA simultaneously requires them to screen 
their workforces for potentially unauthorized immigrants. While employers 
carry out both kinds of screening services, screening for unauthorized 
immigrants presents its own set of challenges. For one thing, screening for 
unauthorized immigrants presents a qualitatively different challenge from the 
type of screening that employers practice within the formal system. Identifying 
immigrants who might contribute to the workplace as legal permanent residents 
entails screening in candidates for admission, which requires them to review 
criteria—like skill sets and credentials and work history—over which 
employers possess some measure of expertise. By contrast, the task of 
identifying those immigrants already within the workplace who are 
unauthorized requires screening out candidates for removal, which effectively 
boils down to reviewing and comparing identification documents, a challenge 
that employers are not particularly well suited to carry out.40 Given this 
distinction, employers who screen for unauthorized immigrants in the 
workplace, in many ways, have more in common with airport inspectors 
screening for suspicious entrants and state and local law enforcement officers 
screening for removable criminal convictsthan they do with those employers 
who screen immigrants for admission.41 Whereas employers are well suited to 
evaluate résumé criteria, they (nor law enforcement officers, landlords, and 
university officials for that matter) are particularly well suited to differentiate 
between authentic and fraudulent work documents. 
39. Those seeking to sponsor and screen-in family members must similarly internalize 
the cost of dependency, caretaking, and integration responsibilities. Family law scholars 
have developed this idea in the context of regulating families. See Martha L.A. Fineman, 
Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2187 
(1995) (explaining that caretaking responsibilities have been privatized, so that “[t]he 
ideology of the private family mandates that the unit nurture its members and provide for 
them economically”); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal 
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 394-95 (2008) 
(“[P]erhaps the most important function that the family serves is the privatization of care for 
dependent members, usually children. The family—and parents, particularly—takes on this 
task, so that it is not primarily the public responsibility of the state.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
40. Importantly, some immigrants who are already within the United States can in 
certain instances adjust their status to that of a legal permanent resident. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255(i) (2006). 
41. See Stumpf, supra note 35, at 385; Wishnie, supra note 35.  
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Further complicating matters is the sheer heterogeneity of the unauthorized 
population. Recent studies estimate that about 1 to 1.5 million noncitizens 
remain in the United States under a “twilight status”—they have satisfied all of 
the requirements to become lawful permanent residents but must wait for their 
paperwork to be processed.42 Moreover, unauthorized status by itself does not 
inexorably lead to the conclusion that a particular immigrant is necessarily 
inadmissible as a candidate for permanent residence and citizenship. For 
example, certain forms of relief, like cancellation of removal, require that 
unauthorized immigrants show among other things that they have been in the 
United States continuously for a period of ten years.43 Neither does a 
noncitizen’s illegal status prevent her during the removal proceedings from 
asserting a right to remain if return to her sending country would mean, for 
example, she would be tortured or beaten on account of her religion.44 
Historical experience also demonstrates that Congress can and does regularize 
the status of many noncitizens for a variety of reasons, either for humanitarian 
purposes,45 or as part of a larger attempt to reform our immigration laws, as it 
did with IRCA. Against this reality, unauthorized immigrants in the workplace 
face a powerful incentive to remain in the United States given that continuity of 
presence lies at the heart of all of these unauthorized channels towards 
citizenship. 
This incentive to remain invisible stands in sharp contrast to the sorts of 
behavior our formal immigration system rewards. To immigrate through formal 
channels requires persistence, education, and creativity. As an immigrant, 
admission through the employer-based visa system can only be secured by 
exerting great effort in securing an employer in the United States who is willing 
to sponsor you. Therefore, formal immigration rewards those immigrants who 
actively engage and convince potential sponsors that they will make good 
workers and thus good citizens. The opposite is true for immigration through 
unauthorized channels. For unauthorized immigrants, once they enter or remain 
in the United States, they are incentivized to blend into their environments. 
They are incentivized to lay low, embrace subservience, and remain in the 
shadows of their communities because they seek not to garner attention and 
admission, but to avoid detection and removal.46 
42. See DAVID A. MARTIN, TWILIGHT STATUSES: A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION (Migration Policy Inst. ed. 2005), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_PB_6.05.pdf. 
43. INA § 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2006).  
44. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
45. See Motomura, supra note 37, at 2049 (identifying the Nicaraguan and Central 
American Relief Act and Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act as examples of where 
“previously unlawful migrants were brought into the lawful fold”). 
46. I thank David Sklansky for sharing this observation with me. See Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982) (“Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry 
into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of 
undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial ‘shadow population’ of 
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To the extent that screening for unauthorized immigants is defensible as a 
part of a larger interior enforcement strategy, that strategy’s defensibility 
reaches its nadir in the workplace. For example, screening for unauthorized 
immigrants within the United States’s interior has gained the most traction 
applied to the criminal justice system. Adam Cox and Eric Posner suggest that, 
rather than looking to an immigrant’s educational background or work 
experience to determine admissibility, immigration judges quite rightly look to 
an immigrant’s record of criminal convictions in determining whether that 
immigrant will be removed.47  In explaining why an ex post system might be 
preferable to an ex ante system, Cox and Posner explain: 
It is difficult to select desirable low-skilled workers on the basis of pre-entry 
information. There are few objective criteria like education or prior work 
history that would be reliable indicators of the ability of a low-skilled 
immigrant worker to be a productive employee in the United States. By 
contrast, an applicant’s post-entry employment record is highly relevant, often 
fine-grained information.48 
They further argue that our unauthorized immigration system permits and 
encourages immigration judges to look to the criminal justice system, which 
provides a quick and easy (albeit contested and contestable) way for federal, 
state, and local law enforcement officers to produce the relevant information 
(convictions) upon which removal decisions might be based.49 The benefit of 
focusing enforcement efforts on noncitizens with criminal records is that it 
allows the DHS to “better screen out undesired types by waiting for noncitizens 
to commit crimes and expelling them.”50 
But employer tips and leads mean very little for a particular unauthorized 
worker’s “desirability.”  The logical force of an ex post system of screening 
criminal noncitizens comes from what convictions presumably tell us about 
those who are screened out. Convictions serve as proxies. Noncitizens who 
commit crimes draw negative attention to themselves and are thus prime 
illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our borders.”). 
47. Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 809; see also Brown, supra note 17.  
48. Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 847. 
49. For a thoughtful analysis of the ways in which discretionary deportation produces 
significant procedural consequences for those seeking relief from deportation, see Gerald L. 
Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2006). Neuman notes that 
this discretion resembles traditional prosecutorial forms of discretion, including the authority 
to decide to bring or not bring removal actions against noncitizens. But it also includes forms 
of discretion that are unique to immigration law, such as relief from deportation. See Nessel, 
supra note 4, at 381 (“With respect to undocumented persons, the INS already relies upon 
prosecutorial discretion in deciding whom actively to deport based upon an evaluation of the 
size of the undocumented population, the economic and humanitarian reasons underlying 
their entrance into this country, the economic necessity for low-wage workers in the United 
States, and the limited funding available to the INS for use in deportation.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
50. Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 846-47.  
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candidates for removal given their presumed “undesirability.”51 This logic does 
not translate so easily from the criminal justice system to the workplace. An 
employer who reports unauthorized workers to the DHS has likely done so 
because those workers have drawn negative attention to themselves—but it is 
unlikely that the negative attention stems from the workers being shiftless or 
unreliable or belligeren. Indeed, in those cases, an employer can simply 
terminate those workers as it might, quite defensibly, terminate any workers 
exhibiting those characteristics.  
So the question becomes, what kind of behavior would prompt an 
employer to go beyond termination and report the presence of unauthorized 
workers to the DHS?  I want to suggest that immigrants who draw attention to 
themselves in this context do not carry the same presumption of 
“undesirability.”  It will not infrequently be the case that an immigrant who 
draws attention to herself is doing so to correct labor and employment law 
violations in the workplace.  In other words, the kind of behavior prompting an 
employer to report that worker to the DHS is the kind of behavior our labor and 
employment laws encourage. Therefore, immigrant dissent in the workpalce 
does not suggest lawlessness.  Indeed, given employers’ incentives to cheat and 
use their immigration authority to exploit their workforces, dissent can suggest 
the opposite. It can mean that immigrants are acting in defiance of lawlessness.  
C. The Harms of Self-Serving Screening Decisions 
Employers are required to screen their workforces for unauthorized 
immigrants, but they don’t carry out these duties in good faith, at least within 
those industries traditionally dependent on low-wage labor. Part of the problem 
is that employers face no real threat of being sanctioned. The number of fines 
the INS and DHS have issued has been steadily declining. For example, in 
1999, the number of notices of intent to fine totaled 417, but by 2001 it dropped 
to 105,52 and by 2004, dropped further still to a measly 3 employers.53 
How did this happen, and what are the consequences? In the following 
sections, I outline what I see as the primary consequences of this arrangement. 
Central to this story is the observation that the DHS has not only failed to 
enforce IRCA against employers, it has worked with them in identifying 
immigrants for removal. Moreover, the DHS has welcomed these “tips” and 
“leads” without much consideration of the conditions triggering or the 
51. I should be clear that I harbor some reservations about Congress’s attempts to 
criminalize an increasing number of activities, but I do agree with Cox and Posner that, at 
least as a descriptive matter, criminal convictions have served an ex post screening function.  
52. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 393 n.25. 
53. See Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Working and Citizenship, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1161, 1214 n.254 (2008) (citing GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: WEAKNESSES HINDER EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND 
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 35 (2005)). 
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consequences flowing from this assistance. As I show, the nonenforcement of 
IRCA against employers—and thus the ceding of far-reaching screening 
authority—has both legal and democratic costs. 
1. Legal harms 
Though I have yet to find an empirical study exploring employer reporting 
and the conditions triggering reporting, the existing empirical—and growing 
anecdotal—evidence all points to the same conclusion: within industries 
traditionally dependent on immigrant labor, employers report the presence of 
unauthorized workers as a way of escaping liability for labor- and employment-
related workplace violations. To get a flavor of the nature of this abuse, 
consider the following examples. At a Minneapolis hotel, a group of hotel 
workers, citizens and noncitizens alike, had voted for union representation. But 
just as negotiations were set to begin, the employer contacted the then-INS, 
which staged a raid on the hotel and detained eight housekeepers.54 Similarly, 
in New York City, several unauthorized garment workers, primarily from Latin 
America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, complained that the factory owner had 
been withholding overtime pay, which prompted the owner to request a raid of 
his own factory. Arresting nearly thirty workers, the INS declined to fine the 
owner for his cooperation.55 Elsewhere in New York, the owner of an online 
grocery delivery service, who employed 900 workers, circulated a memo 
announcing a pending workplace inspection, causing nearly 100 workers to 
leave or never return. This highlights the reality that even just the threat of a 
pending workplace inspection is enough to quell any organizing activity.56 
Although unauthorized immigrants are not entitled to backpay,57 they still 
possess a panoply of other labor and employment rights.58 But despite the 
existence of these rights, reporting and the threat of reporting effectively 
neutralize the ability of unauthorized workers to make this protection 
meaningful. The power that employers wield when they knowingly hire 
54. Philip Martin & Mark Miller, Employer Sanctions: French, German and U.S. 
Experiences 47 (Int’l Migration Papers, No. 36, 2000). This is an exceptional case where 
many of the immigrant workers were granted relief by the immigration judge. See INS 
Grants Deportation Relief to Minneapolis Immigrant Workers Fired for Union Activities, 
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS UPDATE, June 6, 2000, http://www.nilc.org/ 
immsemplymnt/wkplce_enfrcmnt/wkplcenfrc012.htm. 
55. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 389. 
56. See Nina Bernstein, Groceries on the Computer, and Immigrants in the Cold, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007, at B1; Nina Bernstein, Warehouse Workers Quit In Immigration 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at B6. 
57. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148-49 (2002). 
58. See Christine N. Cimini, Ask, Don’t Tell: Ethical Issues Surrounding 
Undocumented Workers’ Status in Employment Litigation, 61 STAN. L. REV. 355, 357-58 n.8 
(2008) (summarizing the various labor and employment claims available to unauthorized 
workers). 
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unauthorized immigrants has not been lost on the federal courts. Most notably, 
in Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc. the Ninth Circuit observed that in addition to 
retaliatory discharge, unauthorized workers face the “harsher reality that, in 
addition to possible discharge, their employer will likely report them to the INS 
and they will be subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal 
prosecution.”59 In affirming the district court’s denial of the employer’s 
discovery requests pertaining to the plaintiffs’ immigration status, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded, “Granting employers the right to inquire into workers’ 
immigration status in cases like this would allow them to raise implicitly the 
threat of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, 
documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices or files a Title VII 
action.”60 Other courts have addressed similar scenarios and reached similar 
conclusions.61 
These decisions highlight the degree to which employers and the DHS 
work collaboratively to detain and remove unauthorized immigrants despite 
apparent violations by the employers themselves. In Montero v. INS,62 an 
unauthorized immigrant from Ecuador worked at a garment factory in New 
York, where she assisted in the efforts to organize workers, and joined a union 
in both an organizing and negotiating capacity. The employer threatened to 
report certain unauthorized workers to the INS. As the dispute escalated, the 
employer’s attorney contacted the INS, resulting in a workplace inspection, the 
immigrant’s arrest, and ultimately deportation.63 Thus, the question is not 
whether employers in immigrant-dependent sectors knowingly hire 
unauthorized immigrants—they do—but rather, under what circumstances 
employers report their presence. Other anecdotal evidence confirms that 
reporting is a prominent tool that employers use to quash organizing efforts. 
Most recently, a DHS raid of a meatpacking plant in Iowa brought public 
attention to the unsafe conditions under which many unauthorized immigrants 
59. 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004). 
60. Id. at 1065; see also Does I thru [sic] XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 
1058 (9th Cir. 2000). In Advanced Textile Corp., the Ninth Circuit addressed whether 
plaintiffs could pursue labor violations anonymously, where plaintiffs were foreign workers 
who faced the possibility of deportation. Siding with the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that the threat of deportation rendered “extraordinary” the nature of retaliation in 
this particular case. Id. at 1070-71. 
61. For example, in Singh v. Jutla, an employer knowingly recruited and hired an 
unauthorized worker and contacted the INS only when the immigrant attempted to recover 
unpaid wages and overtime pay. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also 
Fuentes v. INS, 765 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated by Fuentes v. INS, 884 F.2d 699 
(9th Cir. 1988); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 
1055 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff, a secretary without work authorization, 
could pursue FLSA where the employer reported the plaintiff to the INS in retaliation for her 
filing of a claim seeking unpaid wages and overtime pay). But cf. Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 
381 (2d Cir. 1997). 
62. 124 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1997). 
63. Id. at 382-84. 
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worked; several immigrants attested to lawlessness ranging from physical 
beatings to the denial of overtime pay. One unauthorized worker caught up in 
the raids explained that he often worked seventeen-hour days without breaks, 
noting that “[the employers] told us they were going to call immigration if we 
complained.”64 
The few empirical studies that have examined the experiences of 
unauthorized immigrants in the workplace suggest a correlation between the 
practice of employer reporting and anti-union animus. In a study examining 
employers’ use of the threat of plant-closing to undermine unionizing efforts, 
Kate Bronfenbrenner found that such threats often occurred within the context 
of “other aggressive anti-union behavior by employers.” For example, nearly 
75% of employers that threatened to report unauthorized immigrant workers to 
the then-INS for removal also utilized plant-closing as a threat, compared to 
only 46% of employers who had hired, but did not threaten to report, 
unauthorized immigrants.65 Significantly, Bronfenbrenner’s study also found 
that the willingness of unauthorized workers to join unions or otherwise 
organize with their citizen coworkers increased the likelihood that employers 
would use the threat of reporting. While employers threatened to report 
unauthorized workers to the INS as a response to organizing activities in 7% of 
all unionizing campaigns, the rate jumps up to 52% when unauthorized 
immigrants belonged to the bargaining unit.66 In other words, 
Bronfenbrenner’s study suggests that employers are reporting unauthorized 
immigrants because of the tactic’s convenience as an exit strategy from 
potentially ugly and expen
64. Julia Preston, After Iowa Raid, Immigrants Fuel Labor Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, July 
27, 2008, at A1. Jennifer Gordon’s work also speaks to this phenomenon. In her book, 
Suburban Sweatshops, which draws heavily from her experience organizing low-wage 
immigrant workers, Gordon details the “minimalist approach” that employers take to 
complying with IRCA’s verification duties. She observes: 
If a worker presents documents that appear reasonably legitimate when she is hired, the 
employer records them on the I-9 form designed for the purpose, drops the form in a file, and 
thinks no more about it—until the day comes when such workers make some demand the 
employer wants to resist. It may be a simple request for a bathroom break or for overtime 
wages. More often, it comes as the first stirrings of a union organizing campaign. Suddenly, 
the employer remembers employer sanctions. If he had never filled out I-9 forms, he gets the 
urge to comply with the law, forcing all the workers to provide legal papers on the spot. If he 
has I-9 files, he begins to pay new attention to them, calling the Social Security 
Administration to check on the validity of numbers, demanding to see new versions of 
documents that have expired. 
JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 49-50 
(2005). Gordon further notes that “[e]mployer sanctions has [sic] become the perfect cloak 
under which to carry out an effective campaign of intimidation, sending the clear message 
that immigrant workers who organize are no longer the kind of immigrant workers who get 
jobs.” Id. at 50. 
65. KATE BRONFENBRENNER, UNEASY TERRAIN: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MOBILITY ON 
WORKERS, WAGES, AND UNION ORGANIZING 46-47 (2000), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=reports. 
66. Id. at 44. 
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Another study published by the Center for Urban Economic Development 
confirms the dangers that unauthorized immigrant workers face in the 
workplace. The results of a survey conducted with 1131 authorized and 
unauthorized immigrants in Chicago suggest that unauthorized workers 
experience unsafe working conditions more often than do authorized 
immigrants.67 Despite the high incidence of unsafe working conditions, 94% of 
those unauthorized immigrants indicated that they did not report the unsafe 
working conditions to OSHA. Significantly, 62% of those workers indicated 
that their reason for not reporting related to either the fear of employer 
retaliation or to the fear of deportation.68 The same study found that 
unauthorized immigrants, compared to their authorized counterparts, were more 
likely to experience wage and hour violations; 26% of undocumented workers 
alleged that they experienced nonpayment or underpayment of wages compared 
to only 9% of documented workers.69 
Finally, Michael Wishnie provides an illuminating statistical profile of 
worksite enforcement in New York City, one of DHS’s largest and busiest 
districts. By filing Freedom of Information Act and Freedom of Information 
Law requests, Wishnie obtained DHS worksite-enforcement data for a thirty-
month period in the New York region revealing the deep entanglement between 
INS worksite enforcement and the presence of formal labor disputes. The data 
revealed that more than half of the raided worksites were subject to at least one 
formal complaint to, or investigation by, a labor agency.70 Wishnie plausibly 
argues that the actual correlation between worksite enforcement and labor 
disputes is probably greater when one considers those workplaces that have 
been involved in less formal disputes such as union grievances, ongoing 
litigation, informal complaints, and complaints to related agencies, such as 
those addressing employment discrimination and workplace safety.71 
67. CHIRAG MEHTA ET AL., CTR. FOR URBAN ECON. DEV., UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., 
CHICAGO’S UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: AN ANALYSIS OF WAGES, WORKING CONDITIONS, 
AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 27 (2002), available at http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/uicued/ 
Publications/RECENT/undoc_full.pdf. 
68. Specifically, the report found that of the reasons identified, “32% relate to the fear 
that employers would punish workers for reporting the conditions” and “30% relate 
specifically to the fear that workers might be deported if they report the conditions.” Id. at 
28. 
69. Id. at 29. The survey found that the disparities continued into other wage and hour 
allegations as well: 21% of undocumented workers alleged forced overtime compared to 
16% of documented workers, and 18% of undocumented workers alleged working without 
breaks compared to 7% of documented workers. Id. 
70. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 391-92. 
71. Id. at 392. 
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2. Democratic harms 
Permitting employers to screen for unauthorized immigrants has also 
generated democratic costs in the workplace. To appreciate these costs, I begin 
with the observation that the workplace provides more than just the opportunity 
to earn a paycheck. As Cynthia Estlund has capably shown, the workplace and 
jobs matter not only for the material resources they enable, “but also for the 
positive social ties, norms of reciprocity, and feelings of trust, mutual 
responsibility, and solidarity that they engender.”72 The workplace brings 
people together and creates opportunities to develop a sense of collective 
identity.  
For adult immigrants, the opportunities to develop a sense of collective 
identity that cuts across the lines of citizenship and immigration status remain 
sparse. Indeed, the workplace persists as one of the few areas of public life 
where adult unauthorized immigrants have the opportunity to meet and form 
bonds with citizens. As Cristina Rodríguez reminds us, “For immigrant 
children and the second generation, adaptation occurs in the public schools, but 
adult immigrants simply do not have access to such an assimilating 
institution.”73 Therefore, permitting employers who knowingly hire 
unauthorized immigrants to set the terms of the workplace does more than just 
increase the likelihood of exploitation; it also decreases the possibility that 
adult immigrant workers will seek out or foster meaningful relationships with 
their citizen co-workers. This in turn discourages unauthorized immigrants 
from embracing a sense of identity as Americans or North Carolinians or 
workers or any other collective identity transcending citizenship and 
immigration status.  
The associative obligations being undermined by employers embody more 
than just the wistful aspiration to build a sense of worker solidarity. This 
tangible sense of community often represents a persistent willingness and 
desire to transcend racial differences in the workplace, which if cultivated can 
generate the sort of social peace that our immigration policy must commit to 
achieving. For example, while more empirical research is required, initial 
sociological studies suggest that racial animus and resentment in the workplace 
exist at a relatively low level when compared to other social institutions 
occupying the same geographic space.74 Permitting employers to report 
72. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A 
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 117 (2003). 
73. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What 
Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 237; see also 
JANELLE S. WONG, DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE: IMMIGRANTS & AMERICAN CIVIC INSTITUTIONS 
173 (2006) (“Community organizations, such as labor organizations, workers’ centers, 
advocacy and social service organizations, ethnic voluntary associations, and religious 
institutions, may be more likely than parties to invest in long-term mobilization of 
immigrants.”). 
74. Gordon and Lenhardt note that according to a study conducted by sociologist 
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unauthorized workers who organize with their citizen coworkers, therefore, 
suggests that those immigrants who are screened out are among the more 
racially literate.75 Most unskilled immigrant workers are Latino, and they are 
coming to occupy jobs traditionally held by African Americans. In the process, 
they are being mapped onto a racial terrain,76 and confronting conflict in the 
workplace.77 
Certainly, the unauthorized status of many of these new Latino immigrants 
complicates our notions of a democratic community and its obligations. For 
some, it may seem strange to insist on facilitating the integration of those who 
have yet to be recognized as members of our national community. Yet, it would 
be equally strange to think that someday millions of these immigrant workers 
may become citizens and may be able to do so only after shunning the company 
of, and the attempts to organize by, their citizen coworkers. And it would be 
outright troubling to think that those unauthorized immigrants who never 
became citizens—because they were detected, screened out, and removed—
missed out because they attempted to assert their rights and demonstrate a sense 
of investment in the workplace. 
Thus, our current de facto system of screening the workplace for 
unauthorized immigrants reveals that there are times when we should not 
reward those who lay low. If immigrants are coming to the United States for 
job opportunities, and Congress has empowered employers to act as 
immigration screeners, then the case of private immigration screening in the 
workplace forces us to rethink the kind of immigrant behavior we ought to 
reward. 
Helen Marrow on relationships between black and immigrant workers in a large chicken-
processing plant, “tensions in the poultry plant paled in comparison to those evident in the 
community at large. . . . Indeed, participants in Marrow’s study consistently ‘report[ed] 
positive relations among workers of different racial and ethnic backgrounds as well as a lack 
of racial discrimination.’” JENNIFER GORDON & R.A. LENHARDT, CONFLICT AND SOLIDARITY 
BETWEEN AFRICAN AMERICAN AND LATINO IMMIGRANT WORKERS 25 (2007) (alterations in 
original). For an excellent analysis of the difficulties of finding legal recourse for 
demonstrations of intergroup racial solidarity in the workplace, see Noah D. Zatz, Beyond 
the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63 
(2002). 
75. See Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92 (2004).  
76. See Devon W. Carbado, Racial Naturalization, 57 AM. Q. 633 (2005).  
77. Gordon and Lenhardt explain that the tension between black citizens and Latino 
immigrants in the workplace derives in part from the different paths each group has taken to 
the workplace, which has produced different perspectives on the meaning of work. While 
both groups recognize that they are victimized by the same degrading and humiliating acts in 
the workplace, differing expectations impede the development of a true sense of solidarity. 
While Latino immigrant workers might be able to tolerate subpar conditions in exchange for 
the opportunity to earn wages that exceed many times over what they could make in their 
sending country, black citizen workers can barely tolerate still more proof that they have not 
yet achieved the fruits of full citizenship. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 53, at 1202-19. 
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II. ENFORCEMENT REALITIES, RATIONALES, AND COLLABORATIONS 
IRCA required employers to hire only “authorized” workers, but today 
employers face almost no possibility of being punished for failing to carry out 
these duties. In the Subparts that follow, I explore the origins of this 
phenomenon and explain how and why it has persisted. 
A. Underenforcement as Enforcement Policy 
IRCA’s design and history suggests that Congress intended to deter 
unauthorized immigration by targeting employers. IRCA’s implementation 
history, however, demonstrates that from the very beginning the then-INS 
demonstrated a willingness to work with employers, rather than fully 
committing to a policy of targeting and punishing them.78 
Legal scholarship confirms that employers, at least within traditionally 
immigrant-dependent industries, have continued to knowingly hire 
unauthorized immigrant workers. Kitty Calavita’s 1990 study remains an 
important and relevant explanation of this phenomenon. Conducting interviews 
with hiring managers at over one hundred southern California firms 
concentrated in sectors traditionally dependent on immigrant labor,79 
Calavita’s study establishes that nearly half of those managers suspected that 
they had hired unauthorized workers, and more than ten percent admitted 
outright that they had knowingly hired such workers.80 Several insisted that 
they would continue to hire unauthorized workers despite IRCA’s prohibition, 
which suggests that a combination of competitive pressure and the then-INS’s 
78. Some have hinted at this culture of collaboration. For example, nearly twenty years 
ago, Kitty Calavita noted that early implementation efforts swam in a “spirit of 
cooperation . . . devoted to establishing rapport with employers and encouraging voluntary 
compliance with employer sanctions.” Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: 
Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1061 
(1990). From a similar vantage point, Linda Bosniak observed that “[IRCA] creates a 
structured antagonism of interests between employers and the INS. Under the previous 
regime, . . . employers often cooperated with the INS during the agency’s workplace surveys 
because cooperation frequently meant less disruption of production and because they did not 
face any penalties for hiring undocumented workers.” Linda S. Bosniak, supra note 4, at 
1035. Bosniak could not have predicted the degree to which government-employer 
cooperation would continue even in a post-IRCA world, though she did with great acumen 
identify those dynamics that would enable such cooperation. See id. at 1035-36 (noting that 
the relatively toothless wording of IRCA introduced “elements of direct conflict between 
employers and undocumented workers” and opining that it “will always be in the interest of 
an employer, when faced with the charge of knowingly hiring an undocumented alien, to 
deny awareness of the worker’s unauthorized status”). 
79. Calavita identifies these industries as including the garment, construction, 
electronics, hotel, restaurant, food processing, and building and landscape maintenance 
industries. She excluded the agriculture industry because it was not subject to sanctions 
during the period of study, which was 1987-88. Calavita, supra note 78, at 1046-47. 
80. Id. at 1050-51. 
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perceived impotence encouraged employers to disregard these duties.81 
Contrary to IRCA’s design, employers in these industries have either ignored or 
willfully blinded themselves to the immigration status of their workers, 
screening in unauthorized immigrants. Thus, although IRCA’s design and logic 
set out to narrow employer hiring decisions, agency enforcement policies have, 
paradoxically, enabled and broadened them. 
Many features of the then-INS’s enforcement policy were designed to send 
the message that employers would not be sanctioned as a part of its regulatory 
strategy. For example, as soon as IRCA was passed, the INS embraced a 
recruitment and hiring strategy that could best achieve a cordial, professional 
relationship with employers. It replaced law-and-order border enforcement 
officers, who historically had conducted confrontational and aggressive 
workplace raids, with high-achieving college graduates who offered a skill set 
geared towards conciliatory regulation. As one INS official remarked, 
“Sanctions demands [sic] in some way a new level of professionalism or 
sophistication. You must be better trained and more sensitive.”82 Indeed, INS 
guidelines instituted in the wake of IRCA’s passage “stressed cooperation with 
business” and sought to avoid the possibility of “harassment and heavy-handed 
enforcement.”83 This shift in attitude did not go unnoticed by employers. As 
one restaurant industry representative observed, “Prior to [IRCA], the INS 
would come in and be belligerent. They are coming in today in a much more 
conciliatory way.”84 Over time, the INS has come to be concerned only with 
the most egregious accounts of hiring unauthorized workers—those where a 
raid stands to make a big political splash—so that the vast majority of 
employers are free to hire unauthorized workers without fear of sanction.85 
81. According to Calavita’s study, well over half of the employers believed that other 
employers in similar industries hired unauthorized immigrants, while over thirty percent 
were “convinced” that the INS did not have the ability to enforce sanctions. Id. at 1053. 
82. Jason Juffras, IRCA and the Enforcement Mission of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, in THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION, 
IMPACT, AND REFORM 33, 40 (Michael Fix ed., 1991). 
83. Id. at 41. As one scholar noted: 
In the long run, the new recruitment policy for the Investigations Division may have a 
stronger impact on the agency when this large cohort of special agents begins to assume 
leadership posts. In the past, management positions in the INS have been dominated by 
former Border Patrol officers committed to an enforcement policy of raids and 
apprehensions. The recruitment of agents from different backgrounds, trained to regulate 
businesses instead of apprehend immigrants may erode that pattern and broaden the 
perspectives of agency managers. 
Id. at 40-41. 
84. Id. at 42 (internal quotations omitted). 
85. As early as 1981, certain enforcement officials who supported employer sanctions 
attempted to assuage employer concerns by emphasizing the conciliatory nature of the new 
law. For example, Doris Meissner, then the acting Commissioner of the INS, stated that 
“implementation of the law is not designed to be and will not be antiemployer.” Calavita, 
supra note 78, at 1058 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
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The possibility of employers being sanctioned became even more remote 
when Congress began expanding the grounds for removal on the basis of 
criminal convictions. As a result, the INS reallocated its resources to pursuing 
criminal noncitizens at the expense of targeting incompliant employers, and 
accordingly the number of workplace inspections dropped precipitously during 
the 1990s.86 To be fair, at least some immigration officers, particularly at the 
more junior levels, expressed frustration with the statute itself during the early 
years of IRCA’s implementation. They complained of the difficulty of proving 
that an employer had “knowingly” hired unauthorized workers.87 Moreover, 
over time, some employers obtained congressional protection against sanctions, 
which could only have encouraged the INS as an agency to redirect its 
enforcement efforts away from employers and towards immigrants. But even if 
the INS’s hands were tied in part because of the statute’s narrower provisions, 
and even if the political power of some employers erected barriers to the full-
fledged enforcement of sanctions, these factors alone cannot explain the extent 
to which INS and now DHS officials have continued to remain allied with 
employers against immigrants. 
Puzzling enforcement policy decisions suggest that at least some of the 
prosecutorial impotence has been self-imposed. For example, consider the 
procedures for initiating contact with employers who are the targets of an 
investigation. Once the DHS decides to investigate a particular employer, it 
provides the employer with three-days notice that it plans to dispatch officers to 
question workers and audit the employer’s records.88 But if the DHS were 
serious about targeting employers for immigration law violations it might 
consider pursuing enforcement policies embraced by the Department of Labor 
(DOL), another agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the 
workplace. When the DOL investigates an employer for labor law violations, 
for example, it executes an unannounced visit, rather than providing employers 
with notice, which only provides an opportunity for employers to hide their 
tracks.89 
86. MARTIN & MILLER, supra note 54, at 2 (“Since removing criminal aliens wins the 
INS praise, while sanctions enforcement brings attacks from employers, worker groups, and 
politicians, removing criminal aliens has become the INS’s highest priority.”). While the 
INS investigated 15,000 employers in 1989, by 1995, the number had dropped to just 6000. 
On a related note, in 2004, the Immigration Control and Enforcement Bureau issued a total 
of three Notices of Intent to Fine, down from 417 just five years earlier. Gordon & Lenhardt, 
supra note 53, at 1214 n.254 (citing GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT: WEAKNESSES HINDER EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND WORKSITE 
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 35 (2005)).  
87. See Elizabeth Rolph & Abby Robyn, Los Angeles: A Window on Employer 
Sanctions, in THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT, AND 
REFORM, supra note 82, at 97, 116. 
88. The three-days-notice requirement was a part of the INS’s larger plan to “signal[] a 
cooperative attitude toward employers in designing investigative procedures.” Juffras, supra 
note 82, at 42. 
89. See MARTIN & MILLER, supra note 54, at 32 (noting that DOL inspectors do not 
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Recent workplace enforcement activity by the DHS demonstrates a 
renewed interest in the workplace as a site for detaining unauthorized 
immigrants. Indeed, the number of unauthorized immigrants detained in the 
workplace has been steadily rising,90 which suggests that the DHS has 
reprioritized enforcing immigration laws in the workplace.91 Recent high-
profile workplace raids, like those that occurred at various meatpacking plants 
belonging to the Swift meatpacking company, appear to bolster this idea.92 But 
this reprioritization of the workplace as an enforcement objective has not 
punished employers—at least not as contemplated under IRCA.93 
B. Rationalizing a Necessary Evil 
If employers possess serious incentives to hire unauthorized workers, why 
empower them to screen out the very workers they hope to hire? Why place the 
power to make decisions with serious immigration-related consequences in the 
hands of a decision maker with incentives to cheat? One pragmatic reason is to 
exploit the unique position that employers occupy in relation to unauthorized 
immigrants. Employers are, relative to immigration officials, in a better 
position to identify unauthorized immigrants.94 If the putative reason that 
immigrants enter the United States is to search for work, under this logic at 
least some immigration enforcement authority ought to be transferred to 
employers because they will inevitably encounter unauthorized immigrants. In 
provide employers with notice when making inspections). An employer announcing a 
pending audit is usually enough to compel unauthorized workers to quit or stop coming to 
work. See Bernstein, Groceries, supra note 56, at B1; Bernstein, Warehouse Workers, supra 
note 56, at B6. 
90. Motomura, supra note 37, at 2052. In 2003, the DHS made only 445 
“administrative arrests,” but by 2007, that figure had risen to over 4000. U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/pi/ 
news/factsheets/worksite.htm. 
91. It remains to be seen whether the Obama administration will continue this trend.   
92. In 2006, the DHS raided several meatpacking plants belonging to Swift & 
Company, detaining hundreds of unauthorized workers and culminating a ten-month 
investigation. See Aldana, supra note 13, at 1092-96. 
93. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 90 (“The presence of 
illegal aliens at a business does not necessarily mean the employer is responsible. 
Developing sufficient evidence against employers requires complex, white-collar crime 
investigations that can take years to bear fruit.”). While the presence of unauthorized 
workers at a particular worksite does not mean that the employer can be held liable under 
IRCA, as has been long recognized by scholars, many employers can comport with IRCA’s 
prohibition against hiring unauthorized workers as a matter of law while still knowingly 
hiring unauthorized workers as a matter of fact. See Calavita, supra note 78, at 1060 
(“Through [IRCA’s] affirmative defense and good faith provisions, Congress guaranteed that 
conformity with the paperwork requirements would be taken as an indication of compliance, 
thereby ensuring that violations of the ‘knowing hire’ provision—the real meat of the law—
would be virtually risk-free.”). 
94. Some have characterized employers as “gatekeepers” in the larger system of 
unauthorized immigration. See Manns, supra note 4, at 893-94. 
S LEE 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103 4/25/2009 1:46 PM 
1130 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1103 
 
other words, employer screening is a necessary evil lodged in an immigration 
regime saddled with tradeoffs. 
A regulatory strategy grounded in a worldview of necessary evils 
recognizes the difficulty of regulating employer hiring decisions. In this 
respect, IRCA mirrors other third-party regulatory schemes, where the 
government compels a well-positioned private entity to withhold a legitimate 
good or service which is necessary for others to engage in illegitimate 
activities. The duties that IRCA requires employers to carry out occupy the 
same universe as those required of other uniquely situated private parties: 
airlines must verify that their passengers possess valid documentation for entry 
into the United States,95 banks must keep records and report suspicious activity 
indicative of money laundering,96 employers must withhold taxes from their 
employees,97 and firearms dealers must run background checks on buyers.98 
Our nation’s anti-money-laundering99 regime is particularly instructive. In 
seeking to disrupt criminal finance channels, the Treasury Department relies on 
banks, which possess a positional advantage in terms of the sorts of information 
they can access.100 In the face of the robust growth banks have undergone, 
money laundering laws reject the notion that banks occupy a purely neutral 
position within the larger enterprise of drug and terrorism finance.101 Even the 
95. See 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006). 
96. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight 
Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 311, 324 (2002). 
97. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in 
Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698 (2007) (describing how tax law is structured so 
that employers must withhold taxes from their employees, and remit those taxes to the 
government, which suggests that “[s]tructural systems that engage third parties to help 
facilitate compliance with the federal income tax are thus highly successful”). 
98. Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).  
99. Ronald Noble and Court Golumbic explain: 
“Money laundering” as a criminal term first arose in the United States, in reference to the 
Mafia’s process of commingling illicit income, “dirty money,” with cash receipts of 
legitimate businesses in order to make the dirty money also appear legitimate, or “clean.” . . . 
Today, “money laundering” is used to describe the role Swiss banks played in providing 
secret accounts to protect the assets of Nazis during World War II. The term is also used to 
refer to the process of funneling foreign funds into the coffers of U.S. presidential candidates 
in alleged violations of U.S. laws. Whatever the context, money laundering involves 
disguising the source or use of illicitly derived money to make its subsequent use appear 
legitimate. 
Ronald K. Noble & Court E. Golumbic, A New Anti-Crime Framework for the World: 
Merging the Objective and Subjective Models for Fighting Money Laundering, 30 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 79, 79-80 (1997). 
100. See id. at 92 (“Tainted funds must pass through banks and financial institutions at 
some point before the link between the funds and their criminal origin has become 
sufficiently attenuated.”). 
101. Congress set out to rein in “the emerging class of professional money launderers 
comprising bankers, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals who [were] willing to 
look the other way for a price.” KRIS HINTERSEER, CRIMINAL FINANCE: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF MONEY LAUNDERING IN A COMPARATIVE LEGAL CONTEXT 193 (2002). As 
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Supreme Court has rejected the notion that banks are merely “bystanders” or 
“neutrals” in the fight against criminal finance.102 Mapping a similar logic, 
IRCA sought to regulate employer hiring practices under the belief that 
preventing employers from making work a viable option for immigrants would 
deter unauthorized immigration. 
Some scholars point out that it is employers’ unique position that makes 
them so difficult to regulate. Jeffrey Manns, for example, characterizes 
employers as “gatekeepers” who are compelled “to fill enforcement gaps” 
because of the ideal position that they occupy. Employers are in good position, 
relative to public enforcement officers, to identify unauthorized workers.103 A 
third-party liability system like IRCA promises much needed and cost-effective 
support in deterring unauthorized immigration because employers can gain 
access to information (i.e., a worker’s immigration status) which is largely 
inaccessible to public officials.104 But the same attributes that contribute to an 
employer’s appeal as a gatekeeper make public oversight challenging: an 
employer’s position permits her to shirk her duties without any real possibility 
of detection.105 
Hinterseer observes, globalization, technological innovation, and deregulation have created a 
banking culture that has become more “dynamic and aggressive,” which has meant “for 
regulators one of the fundamental challenges concerns how to create the appropriate 
incentives to ensure financial institutions adopt a compliance culture.” Id. at 338. 
While Congress began targeting money laundering as early as 1970, it really stepped up 
its efforts in 1986 by passing the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA), which for the 
first time truly incentivized banks and other financial institutions to aid the federal effort in 
fighting money laundering. Pre-MLCA, the public revelation that a financial institution had 
some association with a money laundering scheme meant that it had to contend only with 
negative media attention and diminished reputation. But post-MLCA, Congress ensured that 
these same institutions would incur serious, concrete costs, including a fine, which was 
either $500,000 or twice the sum of the laundered money (whichever amount was greater), 
or up to twenty years of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
102. In upholding the constitutionality of these reporting and recordkeeping duties, the 
Supreme Court has noted: 
Congress not illogically decided that if records of transactions of negotiable instruments were 
to be kept and maintained, in order to be available as evidence under customary legal process 
if the occasion warranted, the bank was the most easily identifiable party to the instrument 
and therefore should do the recordkeeping. 
Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 49 (1974). The Court in Shultz went out of its 
way to disabuse the bank Petitioners of the notion that they were “complete bystanders” or 
“conscripted neutrals” but rather concluded that they were “parties to the instruments with a 
substantial stake in their continued availability and acceptance.” Id. at 48-49. 
103. Manns, supra note 4, at 893, 895-98. 
104. Id. at 898 (“Because of their commercial or professional relationships, 
gatekeepers may enjoy privileged access to information about prospective wrongdoing or 
skills that may allow them to process and recognize potential illegal acts in cost-effective 
ways.”). 
105. Manns posits that monitoring duties could be shared with private entities, like 
unauthorized immigrants themselves or other firms, who could be incentivized to report 
employers that fail to carry out their verification duties. See id. at 945-60. 
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Beyond pragmatic considerations, an unmistakable aspect of IRCA’s 
regulatory logic is grounded in a sense of moral responsibility. In the pre-IRCA 
era, as state and local communities like California grappled with the reality of 
unauthorized immigration, courts expressed great consternation over the 
callous and unregulated activities of employers. For example, several cases 
worked their way through the California court system during the early 1970s. 
These cases were brought by lawful workers against employers for hiring 
unauthorized immigrants. As one impassioned California court observed: 
Despite decades of protest and officially expressed concern, there has been no 
solution to the dilemma posed by agriculture’s heavy, short-term need for 
manpower and society’s inability to absorb that manpower when agriculture’s 
need is past. From Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath to the present, the thin gruel 
of public welfare handouts has been farm labor’s principal progress to the 
remote goal of social justice.106 
Though more measured in its tone, the Supreme Court reflected a similar 
sentiment in De Canas v. Bica. The Court understood employer sanctions to be 
just one part of a larger worker-oriented regime, which regulated child labor, 
minimum wages, occupational health and safety, and workers’ compensation. 
In the Court’s eyes, the hiring of unauthorized immigrants no less threatened 
the livelihood of workers by “seriously depress[ing] wage scales and working 
conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens.”107 In this way, IRCA 
resembles other workplace regulations.108 
106. Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 448-49 (Ct. App. 1970). What is so 
interesting about Diaz is the lengths the court went to lay out the sort of legal sea change it 
envisioned as necessary to fight unauthorized immigration. It effectively sketched out the 
blueprints for our modern employer sanctions regime. The court was as specific about 
employer duties as it was casual about diminishing the constitutional rights of workers. 
Putting to one side “possible restrictions on inquiry emanating from civil rights legislation,” 
id. at 599 n.12, the court would have employers conduct a “simple interrogation” at the 
workplace, which would require them to obtain and examine social security cards, along 
with birth certificates, vehicle operating licenses, and alien registration cards. Id. at 449-50. 
Like immigration officers, employers would be required “to determine the status, legal or 
illegal, of each new worker[,]” and would do so under the threat of punishment “by fine or 
jail.” Id. at 450. In what can only be read as a judicial mandate to the legislature, the court 
suggests that “[m]ultiple injunctions covering a wide segment of California agriculture 
would have the cumulative effect of a statutory regulation, administered by the superior 
courts through the medium of contempt hearings.” Id. 
107. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976). It is well known as a historical 
matter that employers have favored unauthorized immigrant workers. As Aristide Zolberg 
observes, much of U.S. immigration policy has been informed by the clash between 
“capitalists eager to maximize their labor supply against defenders of the traditional 
boundaries of American society, whom historians subsequently labeled ‘nativists,’ and urban 
wage workers, who perceived immigrants as a threat to their living and an obstacle to the 
organization of a labor movement.” ZOLBERG, supra note 25, at 5. 
108. See Robert Bach & Doris Meissner, Employment and Immigration Reform: 
Employer Sanctions Four Years Later, in THE PAPER CURTAIN, supra note 82, at 285 (“IRCA 
reinforced the idea that labor market protections and immigration regulations are closely 
intertwined. Employers who hire illegal aliens benefit just as do those who offer 
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The early discourse suggested a concern with a culture of lawlessness 
surrounding employer hiring decisions. Consider the findings and 
recommendations of the Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy 
(SCIRP Report), submitted to Congress in 1981, which identifies employers as 
encouraging the “illegal flow” of unauthorized immigration.109 After observing 
that unauthorized immigrants work and live “at the mercy of unscrupulous 
employers,” the Report goes on to explain that what is “[m]ost serious is the 
fact that illegality breeds illegality.”110 The SCIRP Report describes a culture 
of lawlessness, which is negotiated and reproduced within the hiring context, 
and then, like a contagion, migrates into other contexts: 
The presence of a substantial number of undocumented/illegal aliens in the 
United States has resulted not only in a disregard for immigration law but in 
the breaking of minimum wage and occupational safety laws, and statutes 
against smuggling as well. As long as undocumented migration flouts U.S. 
immigration law, its most devastating impact may be the disregard it breeds 
for other U.S. laws.111 
Perhaps most interestingly, despite the public indifference towards 
unauthorized immigrants that emerges periodically, IRCA’s passage also 
exhibited a palpable concern for the welfare of the unauthorized immigrants 
themselves. The SCIRP Report recognized the human costs of engaging in an 
interior enforcement strategy were not insubstantial, noting, “It is both more 
humane and cost effective to deter people from entering the United States than 
it is to locate and remove them from the interior.”112 Moreover, the difficulty 
of distinguishing authorized from unauthorized workers has long been 
recognized (sometimes quite crudely) by courts as a problem for any effective 
interior immigration enforcement regime,113 and has troubled scholars (often 
quite rightly) for the collateral damage that overzealous enforcement tends to 
generate. 
subminimum wages and poor working conditions. IRCA addressed the same issues of 
responsibility, burden sharing, competitiveness, and productivity that are inherent in any 
workplace-oriented legislation.”). 
109. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 41 
(1981) [hereinafter SCIRP REPORT]. As others have pointed out, the SCIRP Report 
constituted the most significant study of the period leading up to IRCA’s passage. See 
Wishnie, supra note 4, at 194 n.4. 
110. SCIRP REPORT, supra note 109, at 41. 
111. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
112. Id. at 47. 
113. See, e.g., Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 446-47 (Ct. App. 1970) 
(characterizing the “illegal entrant” or “wetback” as a “considerable force in the farm labor 
market” because “illegal entrants are able to blend into the local labor force”). 
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C. Collaborations 
Given the competitive market within which employers operate, the only 
costs they face for immigration law violations are those associated with re-
recruiting, rehiring, and retraining new workers. Not only do these costs as a 
whole not outweigh the benefits of hiring workers who are willing to work 
“scared and hard,”114 that employers—the putative regulatory targets of 
workplace raids—lodge objections within a vocabulary of replacement costs 
demonstrates the degree to which sanctions have disappeared as palpable 
threats.115 Even where border enforcement officers conduct workplace raids—
which certainly force employers to incur unwanted costs—many of these are 
conducted as “cooperative venture[s].”116 Testifying before Congress, John 
Shandley, the Senior Vice President of Human Resources for Swift & 
Company, implored Congress to help find “a collaborative way of 
apprehending all potential illegal workers and criminals in order to minimize 
disruption to the company, the communities and the livestock producers.”117 
But Shandley’s call for a “collaborative way” offers as much descriptive 
substance as it does rhetorical flourish. 
This collaboration, or partnership, which has emerged between our nation’s 
employers and the DHS highlights the ways in which immigration 
responsibilities have become privatized in some important ways. 
Administrative law and other public law scholars have long grappled with the 
consequences of, and tested out the assumptions embedded within, the 
allocation of power between public and private entities. The questions hanging 
over this body of work concern decision-making authority and its limitations, 
114. Motomura, supra note 37, at 2069 (quoting F. Ray Marshall, Economic Factors 
Influencing the International Migration of Workers, in VIEWS ACROSS THE BORDER 163, 169 
(Stanley R. Ross ed., 1978)). 
115. One of the primary concerns that the SCIRP Report focused on was the reality 
that employers could hire unauthorized immigrants and fear nothing more than the 
possibility of having to incur the cost of replacing removed unauthorized immigrant workers. 
As the SCIRP Report notes, “Even if an employer is found to be employing undocumented 
workers, the penalty is merely the cost of finding and training replacements. Furthermore, 
the employer is free to hire still more undocumented/illegal aliens without incurring any 
additional penalties.” SCIRP REPORT, supra note 109, at 61.  
116. Nessel, supra note 4, at 359. 
117. Problems in the Current Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement 
System, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & 
Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 40 (2007) (statement of John 
Shandley, Senior Vice President of Human Resources, Swift & Company) (emphasis added), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/34925.pdf. Some have 
suggested that workplace enforcement in the form of sanctions and raids constitutes, at best, 
exercises of State power designed to achieve symbolic rather than actual enforcement goals. 
See Calavita, supra note 78, at 1060 (“Facing a contradiction between political and 
economic forces, legislators produced a law whose effect was to be solely symbolic.”); 
Pham, supra note 4, at 817 (“Measured over time, the real impact of employer sanctions may 
be a symbolic one.”). 
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and go to whether private entities should wield such authority, and if so under 
what conditions. Centering on those aspects of our culture and society that 
value collective decision making, these scholars often conclude that shifting 
towards a model of governance through private decision making unsettles 
democratic norms.118  
Private decision making is a modern reality. Even a superficial 
examination of what we commonly believe to be paradigmatically “public” 
institutions reveals the degree to which public and private actors engage and are 
engaged by one another across a continuum of relationships.119 Often, the State 
contracts out the provision of public services to private actors,120 where the 
State acts as a consumer weighing different service-delivery options offered by 
competing private entities.121 Examples of this sort of privatization scheme 
range from those that are fairly innocuous such as refuse collection122 to those 
implicating more serious outcomes such as dispute resolution,123 prison 
management,124 military campaigns,125 and overseas humanitarian aid 
delivery.126 
118. In a recent symposium examining privatization, Mark Moore observed that one of 
the challenges wrought by privatization involves the shifting of “the arbiter of value from a 
political process focused on defining collective ambitions and aspirations to an individual 
deciding whether something is good in his or her own (more or less selfish, hedonistic, and 
materialistic) terms.” Mark H. Moore, Introduction: Public Laws in an Era of Privatization, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1215 (2003). 
119. As Martha Minow observes, the privatization phenomenon involves not one type, 
but rather a “continuum of relationships between government and private groups,” where the 
State encourages, exempts, funds, partners, and charters the private sector in order to serve 
the public’s various needs. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for 
the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1255 (2003). 
120. The privatization literature’s center is occupied by discussions about 
governmental entities contracting out services to private actors, who are charged with the 
responsibility of delivering those services for the public’s benefit. See Jody Freeman, 
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1286-89 
(2003) (explaining that privatization in the American context often means contracting out 
public services to private entities). 
121. The conceptualization of the state as a consumer also signifies a shift in our 
culture of governance where public actors evince a newfound faith in market-style 
competition as a way ensuring sound governance. See Minow, supra note 119, at 1230. That 
the state is increasingly turning to for-profit rather than nonprofit private entities 
demonstrates the extent to which market-style privatization has taken hold, even though 
strictly speaking, for-profit and nonprofit entities fall on the same side of the public/private 
divide. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
552 (2000). 
122. Id. at 597. 
123. Minow, supra note 119, at 1238-40. 
124. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437 
(2005). But see Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political 
Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197 (2008).  
125. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY (2003). 
126. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and 
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Other public-private collaborations proceed in a looser fashion, where the 
State retains no formal relationship with the private entity. One well-recognized 
example is the private police, where private security companies provide a wide 
range of “law and order” services traditionally performed by the public police, 
including the patrolling of neighborhoods with the purpose of “safeguarding 
private property against theft, trespass, or damage.”127 Although formal 
agreements may exist, they often only bind the private companies to the 
consumers of these services, and not to the public police, which might 
otherwise impose public norms to which these private companies must 
comport. Other informal collaborations include those that have emerged in the 
war on terror. In what Jon Michaels dubs “handshake agreements,” phone 
companies and parcel delivery services have discreetly shared customer 
information with the executive.128 Although these private companies are well 
situated to provide potentially helpful information in the fight against terrorism, 
Michaels observes that the absence of formal agreements and meaningful 
oversight “leaves Congress and the courts ill-equipped to weigh in on important 
policy considerations regarding the proper scope and calibration of 
counterterrorism and homeland security operations, not to mention ill-equipped 
to intervene to remedy individual instances or patterns of injustice.”129 These 
sorts of opaque partnerships enable waste, corruption, and unjustified 
impositions of force, and provide the victims of such harm little recourse. 
Beyond the curious exigencies of the war on terror, other informal 
collaborations have persisted in more familiar areas of public regulation. The 
criminal justice system’s reliance on informants, for example, represents a 
particularly costly public-private collaboration. Exploring the community and 
institutional consequences of informants or “snitches,” Alexandra Natapoff has 
persuasively shown that:  
Active informants impose their criminality on their community, while at the 
same time compromising the privacy and peace of mind of families, friends, 
and neighbors. . . . In this scheme, the individual willing to sacrifice friends, 
family, and associates, fares better than the loyalist; the criminal snitch is 
permitted to continue violating the law even as those on whom he snitches are 
punished.130 
It is within this type of collaboration that our nation’s employers and the 
DHS belong. Had IRCA been carried out in a manner consistent with its 
the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 154 
(2005). 
127. Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 
611; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 
51-52 (2004). 
128. Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence 
Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 901, 904 (2008). 
129. Id. 
130. Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 649-50 (2004) (citations omitted). 
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structure and logic, we might tell a different privatization story. IRCA formally 
transferred to employers screening authority which was to be used to carry out 
a specific mandate: verify immigration status to exclude unauthorized workers 
from the workplace. But the collaboration that has emerged forces us to tell a 
story where employers use their screening authority to carry out their own 
agendas. And no DHS policy or practice signals to employers that they might 
be held to account for their decisions.  
No mechanism—no statute, regulation, or contract—requires or even 
encourages employers to report the presence of unauthorized workers to the 
DHS. Rather, such a practice is purely the creation of a regulatory regime built 
on informal exchanges and mutually beneficial but less-than-transparent 
arrangements. Employers avoid potentially costly labor and employment 
disputes and low-level DHS officials can meet their quotas and bolster their 
removal numbers. 
This collaboration has exacted a price that exceeds what we typically might 
expect of regulatory failure. To be sure, IRCA has failed to exclude 
unauthorized immigrants from the workplace, leaving the larger goal of 
deterring unauthorized migration hobbled and unfulfilled. But more than this, 
IRCA’s nonenforcement has diluted the potency of labor and employment 
protections; discouraged unauthorized immigrants from taking an investment in 
the workplace; and strained already-tenuous cross-racial relationships in 
regions not yet accustomed to new Latino immigration. And while we may 
debate whether any of these costs are really too steep to bear, that too must be 
considered a cost of this collaboration. Because employers can deploy their 
immigration authority without any public oversight or scrutiny, the public lacks 
even a basic descriptive understanding to engage in the thornier normative 
aspects of immigration policy. 
III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND SCREENING DECISIONS 
If employer decisions have generated difficult and in some cases perverse 
immigration consequences, then we should consider regulating our nation’s 
employers as we would other categories of immigration decision makers. 
Where decision-making authority finds its way into private hands, public 
oversight should follow. As a first step, we must send the right signals. As 
Kenneth Bamberger observes: 
The simplest way to reproduce the attentional effect of an external shock is to 
instruct a decisionmaker, at a discrete point in time, to focus on a particular 
decision. . . . Making individuals personally accountable for tasks signals the 
importance of the task and fosters a sense of responsibility for the outcome.131 
131. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, 
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 440 
(2006). 
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In the context of regulating unauthorized immigrants in the workplace, 
sending the right signals means shifting our focus. Our immigration laws focus 
exclusively on employer hiring decisions. But given the difficulties of 
regulating those decisions and employers’ incentives to cheat, I want to suggest 
that increasing accountability in the workplace also means focusing on 
employer reporting decisions. We must prevent employers from reporting (or 
threatening to report) unauthorized immigrants in order to disrupt the 
suppression of labor and employment rights, and the undermining of citizen-
noncitizen solidarity. Our immigration regime should send the signal that 
employers who abuse their power in this way will be held accountable and 
punished. 
A. Legal and Democratic Accountability 
The DHS’s approach to sharing screening responsibilities with 
nonimmigration entities reflects the urgency with which it approaches the 
challenge of regulating unauthorized immigration. By compelling employers to 
verify the immigration status of their employees, Congress hoped to obviate the 
need for deportation—including the procedural formalities, and hence costs that 
come with it—by creating a regime that proceeded by self-execution. If interior 
enforcement responsibilities remained an exclusively public responsibility, 
regulating unauthorized immigrants in the workplace would require a massive 
reallocation of public resources towards investigating, charging, and 
prosecuting workplaces, a task Congress has long understood as impossible to 
execute. In the debate leading up to IRCA’s passage, for example, the Senate 
report noted: 
Reliance on direct enforcement alone would require massive increases in 
enforcement in the interior—in both neighborhoods and workplaces—as well 
as at the border. This would be more costly and intrusive, as well as less 
effective, than a program which combines direct enforcement at reasonable 
levels with a reduction in the incentives to enter the United States.132 
Such an enforcement strategy would require a significant investment in 
time and resources, which ultimately detracts from the DHS’s efficacy as an 
enforcement agency in other more high-stakes contexts. 
Still, this informal partnership raises some troubling consequences. The 
reality is that the DHS simply cannot handle the challenge alone. It has come to 
rely on our nation’s employers in wading through its reporting backlog and in 
strengthening its public image by more efficiently meeting quotas. Indeed, the 
DHS, as a matter of enforcement policy, appears to conduct no random 
worksite raids. Rather, it relies on frontline persons and entities to screen out 
potentially removable immigrants so that all investigations and enforcement 
132. IMMIGRATION REFORM & CONTROL, S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 8 (1983). 
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efforts flow from “specific intelligence obtained from a variety of sources.”133 
The persistent kernel of discomfort embedded within all privatization schemes 
is the potential for the private abuse of decision-making authority. “From the 
public law perspective, unconstrained discretion is dangerous,” Jody Freeman 
observes, because “[private] contractors make policy decisions rather than 
merely implement the choices of politically accountable bodies.”134 A fear that 
troubles any society grounded in democratic principles remains the possibility 
that its members will suffer a fate they had no opportunity or ability to 
influence.135 For precisely this reason, some argue against private prisons 
because prison managers are incentivized to fill as many cells as possible, 
rather than assessing whether the State’s legitimate interest in punishment has 
been served.136 Others worry that NGO workers might condition access to 
humanitarian aid, such as food and supplies, on sexual favors.137 Still others 
caution that managed-care organizations might deny medically necessary 
treatments to beneficiaries because such treatments are too expensive.138 Thus, 
anxiety over the potential accountability deficit wrought by privatizing services 
lies at the center of much of privatization scholarship. 
Public law scholars urge us to consider how abusive conditions would 
affect the most vulnerable among us. If we look to the margins and shadows of 
our communities, we must grapple with the reality that the failure to properly 
deliver or administer certain services stands to produce dire consequences 
“because those most directly affected by the services or failures to provide 
services are politically and economically ineffectual. Treatment of vulnerable 
populations simply does not work well in markets that depend upon consumer 
rationality or upon political processes that demand active citizen 
monitoring.”139 Indeed, the contested services on which these marginalized 
(and often poor and nonwhite) communities rely usually implicate a broader 
debate that invites disagreement over the social meaning and community values 
those services are supposed to embody. Determining what quality education 
133. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 90. 
134. Freeman, supra note 120, at 1344. 
135. See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS 3 (2002). In describing the 
challenges posed by public-private collaborations, specifically in the context of public 
funding for services administered by religious groups, Minow observes: “What remains 
troubling is the danger that the accumulation of specific decisions to privatize and to shift 
relationships between government and religion may end up altering our lives in ways we 
never have a chance to influence.” Id. 
136. See Dolovich, supra note 124, at 462; see also Freeman, supra note 121, at 633 
(“Private prison officials determine when infractions occur, impose punishments, and, 
perhaps most significantly, make recommendations to parole boards.” (citations omitted)). 
137. Dickinson, supra note 126, at 158. 
138. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1383 
(2003). 
139. Minow, supra note 119, at 1262. For this reason, given the particular 
vulnerability of prisoners, some have argued that prison management should never be 
privatized. See Dolovich, supra note 124. But see Volokh, supra note 124. 
S LEE 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103 4/25/2009 1:46 PM 
1140 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1103 
 
means is very difficult, and the quest for deciding the baseline of human dignity 
that welfare benefits ought to enable offers no obvious conclusion. The 
indeterminacies surrounding these ideas militate in favor of preserving control 
over these ideas within the public sphere, so that they can be worked out 
through collective decision-making channels.140 
Assessing the dangers of a particular privatization scheme can prove to be 
difficult because State entities, not uncommonly, project romanticized notions 
of accountability to justify the turn towards private decision making. For 
example, during the 1970s, crime rates had been steadily rising in the United 
Kingdom. In response, the UK engaged in a “responsibilization strategy” that 
resituated the State within a world where it shared crime control responsibilities 
with citizens and privately organized groups. Its mass-media campaign called 
upon ordinary citizens to realize their own responsibilities in engaging this 
matter of broad public concern.141 But this campaign obfuscated the ways in 
which privatization threatened to redistribute policing services in a manner that 
ultimately harms the poorest and the least powerful, who are incapable of 
acting “responsibly” by purchasing security services.142 Indeed, accountability 
itself is a lofty and vague idea, which can be deployed to serve contradictory 
causes. Homeowners who hire security companies could plausibly argue that, 
from their standpoint, privatization actually increases accountability.143 
Economic markets no less than public institutions, in the broadest sense, can 
ensure accountability through the disciplining effects of the market, “which 
tests the viability of ideas, products, and processes by their ability to attract and 
maintain a sufficient number of purchasers to meet costs and generate desirable 
profits.”144 
140. In creating a framework for identifying which types of privatization schemes 
ought to be subject to public oversight and regulation, Jody Freeman argues: “From the 
public law perspective, the inability to specify a task because it is value-laden, politically 
contentious, and complex militates in favor of government provision or very strenuous 
publicization efforts.” Freeman, supra note 120, at 1343. By “publicization,” Freeman means 
the transfer of public duties to private entities under the condition that those private entities 
“commit themselves to traditionally public goals as the price of access to lucrative 
opportunities to deliver goods and services that might otherwise be provided directly by the 
state.” Id. at 1285. 
141. See David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime 
Control in Contemporary Society, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445, 452-54 (1996). Garland 
notes, “These campaigns, which involve extensive mass media advertising or else the mass 
leafleting of households, aim to raise consciousness, create a sense of duty, and thus change 
practices.” Id. at 452. 
142. Garland observes that “[o]nce ‘security’ ceases to be guaranteed to all citizens by 
a sovereign state, it tends to become a commodity, which, like any other, is distributed by 
market forces rather than according to need.” Id. at 463. 
143. David Alan Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 
90 (2006). 
144. Minow, supra note 119, at 1263. 
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If the DHS’s primary mechanism for ensuring that employers faithfully 
carry out their screening duties is the threat of sanctions, one might ask whether 
we should apply sanctions more frequently and severely. In other words, if the 
problem has been that the DHS has only sparingly enforced IRCA, why not 
embrace a strategy where it regulated employer hiring decisions with vigor? 
While this seems like a logical and intuitive regulatory turn, history has shown 
that in this context, sanctions have proven to be an ineffective tool for adjusting 
employer behavior. In the early years of IRCA’s implementation, for example, 
a 1990 GAO report found that employers had engaged in a “widespread pattern 
of discrimination” where even well-intentioned employers chose not to hire 
U.S. citizens and otherwise authorized “foreign-appearing, foreign-sounding” 
workers because it was simply easier not to hire than to run the risk of 
sanctions.145 Thus, sanctions have proven to be a blunt mechanism for 
calibrating employer hiring practices. Too meek a threat of sanctions has led to 
worker exploitation, and too substantial a threat has led to widespread 
discrimination. 
Unauthorized immigration is a complex phenomenon. Desperate to escape 
poverty in their sending countries, immigrants work in this country to support 
themselves and their families. Anxious to stay afloat in an increasingly 
turbulent economy, employers hire unauthorized immigrants to gain a 
bargaining advantage. Fearful of losing their jobs and simultaneously 
dependent on cheap goods and services, American consumers remain confused 
as to whether unauthorized immigrants help or hurt our economy. Given these 
competing and conflicting interests, any immigration policy shift will involve 
an inevitable set of trade-offs. But whatever distance separates Americans on a 
fair and sensible immigration policy, one thing that most if not all can agree on 
is that the exploitation of the most vulnerable among us advances no legitimate 
immigration goal. Therefore, if employers are reporting unauthorized 
immigrants as a way of avoiding liability for violations in the workplace—and 
using the threat of reporting to maintain exploitative conditions—and if the 
DHS is relying on employer reports as a way of identifying potentially 
removable immigrants in the workplace, then any serious reform efforts will 
require a shift in focus. 
B. Proposed Remedies 
In this Subpart, I discuss two specific remedies: (1) subjecting employers 
who report unauthorized immigrants to the possibility of an audit, and 
(2) threatening the use of the exclusionary rule against low-level DHS officials 
who rely on such reports. Both of these remedies redirect our attention away 
145. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS 
AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 1, 3 (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/ 
d24t8/140974.pdf. 
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from the front end, when employers hire unauthorized workers, to the back end, 
when employers report workers. This shift is designed to signal to employers 
and low-level DHS decision makers that they cannot reap benefits from the 
suppression of dissent in the workplace and to remove the possibility of using 
the DHS as an escape hatch from labor and employment law violations. 
1. Auditing employer reports 
In regulating employers, one modest solution might be to subject 
employers to an audit, where the possibility of being audited attaches when the 
employer reports to the DHS the presence of unauthorized immigrants. 
Scrutinizing reporting, rather than or in addition to hiring decisions, will 
encourage a change in behavior by employers who would otherwise usurp 
IRCA’s screening authority for their own purposes. Presenting the threat of 
being audited would raise another set of costs employers would have to 
consider in hiring unauthorized workers. For some employers, these added 
costs would be enough to sufficiently deter them from hiring unauthorized 
immigrants at the outset—which is precisely what IRCA was designed to do in 
the first place. 
But the more urgent change that an audit could engender concerns those 
employers who would persist in hiring unauthorized workers. It may be that a 
particular industry suffers from a labor shortage and needs workers irrespective 
of immigration status, or it may be that the employers possess a greater 
familiarity and comfort and desire to hire workers from certain immigrant 
communities. But whatever their reasons for hiring unauthorized workers, 
having hired them, employers cannot then turn around and use the threat of 
reporting as a way of exacting and escaping liability for exploitative workplace 
practices. This type of regulatory regime would send the message that 
exploitation will not be tolerated. Employers who knowingly recruit and hire 
unauthorized immigrants will no longer be able to use State power to justify 
low wages and unsafe workplace conditions. The possibility of an audit, which 
is triggered only by reporting, would send the signal to an employer that once 
she decides to hire an unauthorized immigrant, she will be no less subject to the 
collective bargaining process. This would reduce the likelihood of abuse in the 
workplace, because removing the possibility of workplace remedies 
ameliorates some of the bargaining advantage of hiring unauthorized 
immigrants.  
Questions of institutional design can help calibrate the degree of 
punishment that reporting raises. One modest version might be to shame 
employers who engaged in reporting by publicly disclosing the results of the 
audit. This type of shaming punishment, where the public learns that a 
particular employer reported unauthorized workers as a form of retaliation, 
would invite negative media attention and adverse actions by organizations 
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representing labor and immigrant interests.146 Another version might create an 
information-sharing system between the DHS and labor-enforcement agencies 
like the DOL and its state-level equivalents. Here, the DHS would pass along 
these reports to agencies like the DOL, which would conduct initial 
investigations. This too would send the message to employers that using State 
power for personal gain will not be tolerated.147 Still another version would 
seek to monetarily punish employers, so that they would be subject both to any 
liability for workplace violations—like backpay or the denial of overtime 
pay—along with civil sanctions. A more robust version of this same idea might 
be to create a private right of action for the aggrieved worker, so that the 
unauthorized immigrant might be able to recover monetary damages or even a 
temporary or permanent visa. 
Of course, even if employers could no longer report unauthorized 
immigrants, they would still be free to terminate them.148 But if an employer 
terminated a worker as a form of retaliation for organizing with her coworkers 
or to recover unpaid wages and overtime pay, then that worker would be free to 
pursue remedies in court. In this scenario, immigration-related issues such as 
whether a particular worker had authorization to remain in the United States 
would be inapposite.149 Here, the threat of these labor- and employment-law 
remedies would function as the accountability-ensuring mechanism by 
beginning to correct the IRCA-engendered asymmetry that grants employers 
whistleblower immunity regarding workers’ status but denies the same to 
workers who are subject to employer lawlessness.150 
2. The exclusionary rule 
Our reform efforts should target low-level DHS decision making as well. 
Although employers have strong incentives to report unauthorized workers as a 
way of avoiding liability in the workplace, low-level DHS officials have a 
related incentive to rely on these reports to meet agency-imposed quotas. But 
DHS officials should not obtain the benefit of employers and their exploitative 
146. For an interesting exploration of the possibilities of using auditing to monitor 
executive discretion, see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227 (2006). 
147. One interesting scenario might involve employers anonymously requesting the 
inspection of the workplaces of their competitors. This involves an interesting 
anticompetitive, rather than antiexploitation, rationale for the auditing system. 
148. This is precisely the set of facts that caused Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 
(1984), to come before the Court. 
149. Revoking IRCA’s employer sanctions provision would moot Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds’s holding that IRCA prohibits unauthorized immigrant workers from pursuing 
backpay. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147-49 (2002) 
(explaining that IRCA changed the “legal landscape” by prohibiting whatever power the 
NLRB had to order backpay awards to unauthorized immigrant workers). 
150. See Preston, supra note 64, at A1. 
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presents an opportunity to reexamine a regime floating in a state of 
 
practices. One suggestion would be for immigration judges to apply the 
exclusionary rule to any removal proceedings that rely on evidence obtained 
from the type of employer reporting discussed above. At least one recent 
immigration decision reflects this idea in principle. In re Herrera-Priego, an 
unpublished immigration decision, involved precisely the sort of employer 
reporting that has skewed the process by which immigrants are screened out of 
the workplace. In Herrera-Priego, a garment factory owner denied the workers 
overtime as required by law. When the workers filed grievances, the employer 
discharged the workers who had filed complaints. As the labor dispute unfolded 
and union representatives pressed for reinstatement of the aggrieved workers, 
the employer, looking for an easy exit, contacted the INS to request a raid of 
his own factory. The INS raided the factory, detained several workers for 
deportation, and declined to sanction the employer in exchange for his 
cooperation.151 During removal proceedings, two of the workers successfully 
suppressed evidence and terminated proceedings because the INS agents 
violated an internal enforcement policy that required enforcement officers to 
confirm whether a tip was proffered to quell a labor dispute.152 Central to the 
decision was the observation that the enforcement policy “was designed to 
protect fundamental labor rights.”153 
Herrera-Priego hints at what kind of reform might be possible by sending 
the right set of signals to employers. Instead of permitting employers to hire 
unauthorized immigrants with the expectation that they can always report those 
immigrants should the immigrants attempt to vindicate their workplace rights, 
the principles embodied by Herrera-Priego foreclose reporting as an escape 
hatch. This puts employers to a choice: either they screen for unauthorized 
immigrants in good faith when making hiring choices, or they knowingly hire 
unauthorized immigrants and face all of the limitations imposed by labor and 
employment law. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have focused on the widespread problem of our nation’s 
employers hiring and exploiting and reporting unauthorized immigrant 
workers. This point matters, I have contended, because the identity of those 
making immigration decisions affects the identities of those who ultimately join 
our communities. Thinking about employers as private decision makers 
151. In re Herrera-Priego, Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge (July 10, 
2003) (on file with author). 
152. Operations Instruction 287.3a provides that “whenever information received from 
any source creates suspicion that an INS enforcement action might involve the Service in a 
labor dispute, a reasonable attempt should be made by Service enforcement officers to 
determine whether there is a labor dispute in progress.” Id. at 4. 
153. Id. at 24. 
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disrepair.154 It seems that even immigrants who are authorized to work in the 
United States with the primary objective of serving the greater American public 
may quickly find themselves being coerced into doing work that benefits their 
employers to the public’s detriment.155 Moreover, recent reports of low-level 
corruption within our nation’s immigration regime have been emerging; in one 
particularly troubling incident, an immigration officer conditioned the 
processing of an immigrant’s green card application on sexual favors.156 
Recent scholarship has empirically demonstrated the sheer arbitrariness of 
asylum determinations, where the difference between life and death sometimes 
turns on which judge is assigned a particular case.157 All of these examples 
suggest that problems of accountability pervade our immigration regime. 
Developing levers for ensuring accountable decision making within the 
workplace, therefore, is an important first step in bringing other areas of 
immigration law in line. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154. David Sklansky argues that the “paramount benefit of studying private 
security . . . is the new insight we can gain into old, familiar problems: the regulation of 
public police, the limits of state action, and the affirmative duties of government.” David A. 
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1999); see also Charlie Savage, 
Nina Bernstein & Robert Gebeloff, Vetted Judges More Likely to Reject Asylum Bids, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at A17. 
155. For example, under the J-1 visa system, foreign doctors who come to the United 
States for further medical training are given the option of staying permanently if they agree 
to provide medical care to poorer, underserved communities for a period of years. At the 
conclusion of their service, these doctors are given the opportunity to obtain permanent 
residency and eventually citizenship. But supervising physicians might direct the J-1 foreign 
doctors away from the intended communities, and toward more affluent communities, where 
they can perform more expensive procedures for patients with more comprehensive 
insurance coverage. See Marshall Allen, Indentured Doctors, LAS VEGAS SUN, Sept. 30, 
2007, at A1 (“There is a financial motive to work the foreign doctors long hours outside the 
underserved areas: The J-1 doctor makes the most money for his boss by performing higher-
paying procedures in hospitals or clinics that serve patients with good insurance coverage. 
Or, J-1 doctors can be used to rake in revenue through multiple call shifts—12- or 24-hour 
hospital assignments during which they admit and treat walk-in patients.”). 
156. Nina Bernstein & Angelica Medaglia, An Agent, a Green Card, and a Demand 
for Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, at A1. 
157. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee 
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2008). 
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